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This dissertation contains three essays. It provides analysis on issues concerning
about family economics.
The first essay investigates issues about intergenerational transfer in China. Does
parental support in China respond to low income of the elderly? Intergenerational
transfers from adult children to their parents are thought to contribute a significant
portion of old-age support in China. With a fast growing elder population and an
increasing old-age dependency ratio, it is important to understand these transfers.
This study investigates the determining factors of intergenerational transfers in China.
This line of research is still lacking due to the scarcity of detailed household data. Past
studies on private transfers in China could not differentiate between intergenerational
versus intragenerational transfers. Using pilot data from the newly released China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), I found that around half of
the sampled households received transfers from adult children and the amount of
transfer is as much as two-thirds of household income per capita. Data also showed
that poorer households are more likely to receive transfers. Data suggested that
people in the poor province (Gansu) have a higher degree of dependence on adult
children, as the source of providing old-age support and living arrangement. Seeing
how private transfers are large, widespread, and responsive to income, the benefits
from instituting appropriate public policy would likely accrue in part to younger
generations by lessening their burden of familial support.
The second essay examines the effect of social father on the well-being of out-
of-wedlock children. Social fathers, defined as stepfathers or unrelated cohabiting
romantic partners of biological mothers, have become more widespread as a result
of the increasing out-of-wedlock childbearing. With more young children living with
social fathers, it is important to understand the effect of social fathers on the well-
being of children. Previous research focused more on such effect on older children
or adolescents. Using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
(FFCWS), I find that children with social fathers scored around three points less in
a cognitive ability test than children living only with biological mothers. I used the
propensity score matching method to address the selection issue for which the child’s
mother self-selected into having a new partner. Social fathers will be more common
because of the widespread of non-marital births. Any negative effect caused by the
social fathers will affect a large portion of child population.
The third essay evaluates the association between the timing of parenthood and
the timing of retirement. Is late parenting associated with late retirement? The trend
of parenthood timing is under drastic change. The birth rate for women aged 30-34
rose from 52.3 births per 1000 women in 1975 to 96.5 births per 1000 women in 2010
while the birth rate for women aged 20-24 went down from 113 births to 90 births
per 1000 women during the same period. The children may still be very young when
their parents enter their retirement age. In the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
20% of respondents’ children lived with them while nearly 30% of these children were
below 18 years of age. Despite the potential importance of this issue, economists have
not done much research on it. Using the HRS, this study found that parents who
have their first child before or at age 30 retire earlier than parents who have their
first child after age 30. This positive association holds for different sub-groups of
the sample. With significant portion of people delaying their parenthood and a large
group of people entering their retiring age, it is very important for policy makers and
economists to understand how the timing of parenthood associates with the timing
of retirement.
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Chapter 1
Private Old-Age Support in China: New Evidence from the
Rich and the Poor
1.1 Introduction
Private inter-household transfers have an important role in resource reallocation, es-
pecially in developing countries. A significant portion of the private transfers are
intergenerational - between parents and adult children. The main objective of this
study is to investigate how the income of elderly relates to the intergenerational trans-
fers from their children in two China’s provinces. This paper answers the following
questions: Does parental support respond to low income of the elderly? What factors
other than elderly income stimulate parental support in China?
The pattern of intergenerational transfers in China and in most developing coun-
tries has been found to be totally different from that of developed countries. In
developed countries, such as the U.S., intergenerational transfers are more likely to
flow from parents to adult children. In developing countries, the opposite direction
is more common1.
Because private transfers from children to parents appear to function like old-
1For example, using a U.S. dataset, Gale and Scholz (1994) found that 84.2 percent of private
transfer recipients received money from parents but only 3.6 percent received money from children.
Lee, Parish and Willis (1994) found that around 75 percent of those sampled in Taiwan gave money
to parents while only 18 percent transferred money to children.
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age support, there is an urgent need to study these transfers considering the rapid
aging of China’s population. The percentage of people aged 60 or above will increase
from 10 percent in 2000 to an estimated 23 percent in 2030. The main reason of the
aging population is the drastic decline in total fertility rate2 over the past several
decades. The rate dropped from around 6 in the late 60s to below 2 in mid-90s
(United Nations, 2008)3. At present, a large cohort of adults in China is at the end
of their childbearing age. This generation also has a much lower fertility rate than
the previous generation. They will pass their 60th birthday in the next 10-15 years.
With an increasing demand of old age support, it is necessary to examine how the
future needs of the elderly can be satisfied.
In China, public old-age support programs are quite small and the coverage is
limited. Old-age pension spending in China was around 400 billion yuan in 2005,
or 2.2 percent of China’s GDP. This figure was relatively low considering old-age
spending in the US was 5.6 percent of GDP in 2005. The coverage of the pension
system was still small with 43 million old-age pension recipients, around 20 percent
of the older population4 (Salditt, Whiteford and Adema, 2008). New old-age support
programs are also developed, but their scopes are not big and are often targeted to
urban areas (Zimmer and Kwong, 2003).
Even with the availability of public old-age support, adult children are still the
major source of old age support for parents in China5. In the sample I used, parental
support contributed around 60 percent of per capita household income among trans-
fers recipients. This may be unheard of in developed countries. Yet, it should not
2The average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their
reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates of a given
period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman.
3The drop was most pronounced during the late 70s and the early 80s after the one-child policy
was introduced in 1978.
4Aged 60 or older.
5For example, in the China Urban Labor Survey, conducted in 2002, around 60 percent of the
respondents agreed that adult children should take some responsibility in supporting their parents.
Also, 90 percent of the respondents are willing to support their parents (Cai, Giles and Meng, 2006).
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be surprising considering the fact that filial piety has been the core value in Chinese
culture for two thousand years. Supporting elderly parents, especially financially, is
always viewed as the responsibility of children. It has also been institutionalized by
law (Chou, 2011a)6. Apart from the law, a voluntary contract called “family support
agreement” between older parents and adult children emerged in 1984, with details on
how the old-age family members are supported7. With a significant portion of old-age
support coming from the children, a thorough understanding of private transfers in
China is necessary. Issues such as how public pension system can supplement private
transfers, or whether public pension will crowd out private transfers will be crucial
for the development of effective and efficient old-age support policies.
Adult children, the main suppliers of private old age support, are also deeply
affected by the rapid aging of China’s population. The old-age dependency ratio8 is
estimated to increase from 1:10 in 2000 to around 1:4 in 2030 (United Nations, 2008).
Demographic changes in China and the one-child policy have led to the emergence of
the 4-2-1 family structure (four grandparents, two parents and one child) as the new
dominant form (Zhang and Goza, 2006). The sandwich generation, mid-aged adults
who simultaneously care for their parents and their children, oftentimes needs to take
care of four aging parents and the child. Most people of the sandwich generation agree
that it is almost impossible for their single child to support four grandparents and two
parents in the future. Some of them who are financially capable are actively making
their own retirement plan (Zhang and Goza, 2006). A functional and sustainable
public old-age support system may lessen the burden of supporting their aging parents
for the sandwich generation at present and provide them financial support in the
6For example, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of the Rights and Interests
of Elderly provides guidelines on the legal responsibilities of family members in providing economic
support, household, care in daily living, medical care and expenses, and emotional support for adults
aged 60 or above (National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 1996).
7See Chou (2011a,b) for detailed discussion on “family support agreement.”
8The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 years or above to the
population aged 15-64.
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future.
The pattern of intergenerational transfers is very likely to be diverse in different
areas in China because of the significant income gap and the uneven coverage of
the pension system. The economic growth of China in the past 20 years has been
spectacular9 but the growth pattern has been uneven. The inequality between rural
and urban areas and the income gap between coastal and inland area has been rising
(Goh, Luo and Zhu, 2009; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Apart from that, the coverage
of China’s pension system mainly limits to urban areas10. Most of rural population
is still without pension coverage11. Due to the income gap and the uneven coverage
of pension system, intergenerational transfer is a more important source of old age
support in rural or poor areas than in urban or rich areas.
Intergenerational transfer in China is still under-researched because of a lack of
high quality household data. Recent papers (Cai, Giles and Meng, 2006; Liu and
Reilly, 2004; Secondi, 1997) have investigated private transfers between family mem-
bers in China. Due to limitations of the datasets, their studies focused on all financial
transfers or remittances made by non-coresiding family members or friends. The re-
searchers could not differentiate intragenerational transfers from intergenerational
transfers since they included transfers from friends and family members other than
adult children. Past studies also had limited information regarding the suppliers of
the transfers.
A new and detailed micro-level dataset, the China Health and Retirement Lon-
9The annual per capita growth rate has been about 9 percent since 1990. The overall living
standards have also improved significantly with significant poverty reduction (Chen and Ravallion,
2007).
10China established a pension system as early as in the 50s through the state Council’s Regulations
on Labor Insurance. It targeted the state enterprises employees by providing them retirement
income. Employees of private sectors are not required to participate in the system. Though reforms
of expanding coverage of the system have been done throughout the years, the pension system’s
coverage is still limited mainly to urban areas. Around half of urban employees are covered (Cai,
Giles and Meng, 2006; Dong and Ye, 2003; Salditt, Whiteford and Adema, 2008).
11For example, in 2000, around 7 percent of rural population aged 60 or above received public
old-age support, while 85 percent of them received support from family members (Salditt et al.,
2008).
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gitudinal Study (CHARLS), contains in depth information of each transfer received
by the households. CHARLS enables researcher to focus solely on intergenerational
transfers from children to parents. CHARLS contains information on two provinces in
China: Zhejiang, a rich coastal province and Gansu, a poor inland province. Because
of radical variation in terms of economic development between them, their transfer
patterns are very likely to be significantly different. This unique setting enables me
to compare and contrast the transfer patterns between these two radically different
provinces.
Results showed that intergenerational transfers are widespread in China with
nearly half of the households in the sample received positive net transfer from the
children. Transfers are the major source of income for the elderly as the amount of
transfers can be as high as two-thirds of household income per capita. The likelihood
of receiving transfers is found to be negatively correlated with elderly pre-transfer
income in both provinces, which is consistent with transfer theory in the literature.
Significant differences on transfer patterns between the two provinces are also
found. For example, a higher percentage of households in Gansu received transfers
from adult children. Also, a higher percentage of elderly in Gansu are living with
adult children. These differences appear to come from tradition. With a lower degree
of economic development and lesser contact with Western culture, people in Gansu
are very likely to hold tradition more strictly than people in Zhejiang. Questions
in CHARLS asked about respondent’s opinion on living arrangement and old-age
support for elderly. Results showed that people in Gansu view the children as the
best source for providing support for elderly while people in Zhejiang depend more
on themselves. These results further support the role of tradition in shaping the
differences in transfer pattern.
Considering the rapidly increasing old-age population in China and a large portion
of old-age income coming from children’s transfers, the benefits of having appropriate
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public old-age policy would be substantial in both financial terms and number of
people affected. For areas similar to Gansu, appropriate old-age policy will be very
important as intergenerational transfers are vital for people in those areas. A thorough
understanding of intergenerational transfers in China and its determinants is much
need. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.
1.2 Literature
1.2.1 Literature on Intergenerational Transfers
Understanding intergenerational transfers is important for policy makers. Economists
are particularly interested in the motives behind making intergenerational transfers.
This interest follows from the observation that different transfer motives elicit varied
responses from the transferors in response to public policy. Broadly speaking, two
main competing theories generate more interests among economists: the altruistic
motive and the exchange motive. A negative correlation between transfer amounts
and the recipient’s income is consistent with both the exchange model and the al-
truistic model. On the other hand, a positive correlation is only consistent with the
exchange model (see discussion below). This difference allows economists to test the
transfer motive empirically. This is very important for public policy because the effect
of public transfer can be neutralized by private transfers depending on the transfer
motive. If altruism is the motive, a public transfer to the recipient will raise her
income and thus decrease the private transfer from the donor. In that case, public
transfer would crowd out private transfer and the recipient could be worse off. If
exchange motive is true, public transfer may increase the amount of private transfer.
In that case, public transfer can further improve the well-being of the recipient.
Becker (1974) first proposed altruistic behavior within a household. Altruistic
behavior occurs when it is assumed that the utility of household member d (the
6
donor) depends positively on the well-being of another household member r (the
recipient). The basic prediction of the altruistic motive model is that the probability
and amount of transfers are both positively correlated with the income gap between
donor and recipient. It is easy to show that if the donor’s income increases, the
probability of the donor transferring money to the recipient will increase. Also, given
the transfer between the donor and recipient occurs, an increase in the donor’s income
will raise the amount of the transfer. On the other hand, the model predicts that if
the recipient’s income increases, the probability of the donor transferring money to
recipient will decrease, and given the transfer occurs, the amount will also decrease.
Cox (1987) proposed the exchange motive to model transfer behavior. Under
the exchange motive, donor’s money transfers are payments for services provided by
the recipient. One of the main predictions of an exchange motive model is on how
the recipient’s income affects the amount of money transferred. Under the exchange
model, an increase in donor’s income will still increase both the probability and the
amount of money transfer as in the altruistic model. This is because the donor is
willing to pay a higher price for the services, assuming the donor views the services
as normal goods. An increase in the recipient’s income still lowers the probability of
the transfer as it does in the altruistic model. However, it also raises the recipient’s
opportunity cost of providing the services. She will demand the donor to pay a higher
price for the services. Given the transfer does occur, the amount of the transfer could
either increase or decrease depending on the elasticity of the donor’s demand for the
services. If the donor’s demand for the services is elastic, she will use a cheaper
substitute for the recipient’s services and will reduce the transfer amount to the
recipient. If the donor’s demand for the services is inelastic, she will make a larger
transfer to the recipient because of the higher price charged for the services. In this
case, a positive correlation between the recipient’s income and transfer amount will
be observed.
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Many past studies have tested transfer motives empirically. Nonetheless, the ev-
idence on transfer motives is mixed. Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) found
positive correlation between transfer amounts and recipient’s income using household
data of the United States. Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998), using data of Peru, also
found a positive correlation between the two variables of interest. The results from
these three studies were all significant and thus provided evidence to support ex-
change motive. On the contrary, McGarry and Schoeni (1995) found a negative and
significant relationship between transfer amounts and the recipient’s income using
the Health and Retirement Study, a U.S. dataset. Their study is the only one so
far to find a strong evidence to support pure altruistic motive. Some other studies
failed to find significant results to support either of the two motives. For example,
Knowles and Anker (1981) studied remittances by migrants in Kenya. They were
unable to find any significant correlation between the remittances and the recipient’s
income. Lucas and Stark (1985) examined transfers in Botswana and found a positive
correlation between the transfers and recipient’s income; their result seemed to reject
the altruistic motive but it was not significant. A study by Altonji, Hayashi and
Kotlikoff (1997) using U.S. data found that richer recipients received lower transfers,
which was consistent with the altruistic motive. However, they also claimed that
their result rejected a pure altruistic motive because the relationship between the two
variables was not one to one while a pure altruistic motive should produce a one to
one relationship. They also claimed that they could not find any evidence to support
the exchange motive.
1.2.2 China’s Intergenerational Transfers
Due to scarcity of high quality household data in China, empirical studies on Chinese’s
intergenerational transfers are very rare. Secondi (1997) used data from rural sample
of a Chinese household survey. The data from the survey referred to the year of
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1988 drawn from 28 of China’s 30 provinces. The author used the data to test the
validity of the altruistic and exchange motives. He claimed that the concept of filial
piety is the core value of Chinese family for a very long time and this family value
should lead to widespread altruistic behaviors. In contrast, the exchange motive
would occur only if the parents can provide service to their children. One of the
possible services is taking care of grandchildren. The survey used in Secondi’s study
contained information on inter vivos transfers but not bequests. Income remitted
or brought by non-coresident family members is the main variable of interest. By
definition, this variable can include the remittances made by young males migrating
to urban areas to their wives and dependents in rural areas. Results showed that a
quarter of the families received transfers are headed by lone females. At the same
time, most of these women are in their thirties and forties. The author claimed
that those transfers are more likely to be intragenerational. Without other in depth
information of the remittances, Secondi’s study was unable to differentiate between
intergenerational transfers and intragenerational transfers. The main finding of his
study is a positive correlation between transfer amount and recipient’s income. The
author claimed that the altruistic motive alone cannot explain transfers and the
exchange motive must also be involved in some transfers. However, we should view his
result with caution. It is quite possible that the motives underlying intragenerational
transfers are different from the motives underlying intergenerational transfers. Most
of the intragenerational transfers are thought to be between husbands who migrate
to urban areas and wives who stay in rural home. Altruistic model (Becker, 1981)
and bargaining models (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981) are
examples of economic models on marriage. Intragenerational transfers can obviously
be motivated by altruism while it would be harder to understand how exchange motive
can exist within a marriage. Thus, the inclusion of intragenerational transfer may
actually bias the result in Secondi’s study.
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Liu and Reilly (2004) used a 1995 survey on male migrant workers in Shandong
province. They examined the determinants of remittances made by the migrant work-
ers to rural households. They found that the recipient’s income was not a significant
factor on remittances. They claimed that the result seemed to reject altruistic mo-
tive and at the same time did not support exchange motive. Some limitations of
their study should be noticed. All the information in the survey was provided by the
male migrant workers including the income of the recipients. The authors mentioned
that the information on the rural households may not be very accurate because some
of the migrants have moved out for quite a long time. We should also note that
a significant portion of remittances made by the migrants to rural households may
be intragenerational in nature. This inclusion would bias the result as in the study
by Secondi (1997). Liu and Reilly noticed the possible inclusion of intragenerational
transfer. They further did an analysis on non-married migrant in an attempt to par-
tially exclude intragenerational transfer. They yet again failed to find any significant
correlation between the recipient’s income and remittances.
Cai, Giles and Meng (2006) used the China Urban Labor Survey conducted in 2001
and 2002 to test how private transfers to retired workers respond to the workers’ pre-
transfer income. The survey was conducted in five large cities, including Shanghai,
Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou, and Xian. They used two estimation methods for their
analysis. The first method is a conditional least squares threshold model used by Cox,
Hansen and Jimenez (2004). This method allows the relationship between transfer
amount and pre-transfer income to change if income is above a threshold. They
found that the transfers were 0.52 to 0.68 yuan per capita higher for each yuan
reduction in income if the recipient’s income is below the threshold. This figure
dropped to zero if income is over the threshold. The second method they used is a
semi-parametric partial linear model (Yatchew, 1998, 2003). This method allows the
relationship between transfer amount and pre-transfer income to change smoothly
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along the income level. With this method, they found that the transfer were 0.2 to
0.26 yuan per capita higher for each yuan reduction in income for income levels below
half the average urban poverty line. This figure dropped to 0.1 to 0.16 yuan around
the level of poverty line. The figure further dropped to close to zero at income level
twice the poverty line. They claimed that at a low enough income level, their results
were consistent with the altruistic motive. Their study had the same limitation as
other Chinese transfer studies. The transfer variables they used are gifts given to
or received from friends and relatives. This definition of transfer again may include
intragenerational transfer. Also, transfers from friends should not be included in the
analysis as this type of transfer has an underlying rationale different from transfer
made by children.
Apart from studies by economists, sociologists have also studied Chinese intergen-
erational transfers. For example, Lee, Parish and Willis (1994) studied intergenera-
tional support from adult children in Taiwan. They found that most married children
provided financial support to their parents. They also found that elderly parents with
higher levels of needs received more support from children. Another study by Lee
and Xiao (1998) examined financial support by children in urban and rural China.
They also found that children provided more financial support to parents with more
needs.
1.3 Theoretical Model
The analysis of this paper follows the model proposed by Cox, Eser and Jimenez
(1998). In the model, utility interdependence is assumed. Parents care about their
children and children also care about their parents. When children’s income is very
low, parents will transfer some money to the children. This situation may exist, for
example, when the children just enter labor force. Similarly, when parents’ income
11
is very low, children will transfer some money to parents. This situation is likely to
occur when the parents are in the retiring age. The following is the formal set up of
the model. Parent’s utility is as follows:
U = U(Cp, V ) (1.1)
where U denotes the parent’s utility. Parent’s utility depends on two factors: parent’s
own consumption, Cp, and child’s utility, V . Utility interdependence is assumed,
child’s utility is as follows:
V = V (Ck, U) (1.2)
where V denotes the child’s utility12. Child’s utility depends on two factors: child’s
own consumption, Ck, and parent’s utility, U .
The existence of imperfect capital markets is assumed. This assumption allows
no asset accumulation or borrowing in the model13. A person’s consumption comes
from two sources: the person’s own income and net transfer received. Thus, we have
the following budget constraint:
Ci = Ei + Ti, i = p, k (1.3)
where Ei is pre-transfer income and Ti denotes net transfer received, i.e. transfers
received minus transfers given. By definition, Ti can be negative depending on the
endowment of the pre-transfer income.
Parent and child are assumed to coexist for two periods. Analysis of the model
is on these two periods alone. Because of the existence of imperfect capital market,
12Cox et al. (1998) assumed that the reduced forms of equations (1.1) and (1.2), expressed in
terms of consumption, are well-behaved. One person must value own consumption more than the
other person’s consumption (Becker, 1974, pp. 1080-1081, fn. 30).
13Altig and Davis (1989) and Cox (1990) have detailed analysis of the connection between inter-
vivo transfers and liquidity constraints.
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the transfer analysis for each period is independent of each other14. It is assumed
that the transfer decision is made at the beginning of each period. The endowment of
pre-transfer income is assumed to be the following: in the first period, child’s income
is low and parent’s income is high; in the second period, child’s income is high and
parent’s income is low. Under this setting, the parent would transfer money to the
child in the first period and the child would make a transfer to the parent in the
second period.
Under the altruistic motive, an increase in the recipient’s pre-transfer income
always triggers a decrease in the amount of the transfer. The term transfer derivative
is used to indicate this relationship. In this model, we have the following two transfer
derivatives: ∂Tk
∂Ek1
< 0 and ∂Tp
∂Ep2
< 0. Here is the elaboration on the second transfer
derivative. In the second period, the child makes a transfer to the parent. Parents
with a higher pre-transfer income, Ep2, need a smaller net transfer received, Tp, to
achieve the same level of consumption. That level of consumption is optimal from the
child’s perspective and thus the transfer derivative is negative. The transfer derivative
can be written as follow:
∂Tp
∂Ep2
= −1 + ∂Tp
∂Ek2
(1.4)
The negative one in the equation means that with second-period family income (Ek2+
Ep2) held constant, an increase in the parent’s pre-transfer income will be met with
a dollar-for-dollar decrease in parent’s net transfer received. Yet, the increase in
parent’s income also raises total family income. Thus, the decrease in transfer will be
less than dollar-for-dollar if the second term on the right hand side is positive15. The
logic is the same for the first period ( ∂Tk
∂Ek1
< 0), in which the parent makes a transfer
14Cox et al. (1998) noted that the assumption of imperfect capital markets is critical for the
results predicted by the model. If capital market was perfect, the timing of transfers would be
indeterminate. For more details, see Cox (1990) and Cox et al. (1998).
15The magnitude of transfer derivative can be large. Cox et al. (1998) mentioned that a Cobb-
Douglas utility function with equal weighting on parent and child utility would give us a fifty cents
decrease in transfer for a dollar increase in income.
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to the child16.
Apart from the amount of the transfer, the decision of making a transfer is also
affected by the pre-transfer income level. Under the altruistic motive, it has been
proved in past literature that the same qualitative comparative statics govern the
transfer decision and transfer amount (Cox, 1987). For example, in the second period,
child determines whether to make a transfer or not by comparing the marginal utility
of her consumption and the marginal utility of parent’s consumption. The level of
marginal utility is determined by the income of both parent and child before making
any transfer. A rise in parent’s income will lower the marginal utility of parent’s
consumption. It will lower the child’s likelihood of making a transfer to the parent.
The logic is the same for the first period, in which the donor-recipient roles are
reversed. It is always the case that if the recipient is richer, she will be less likely to
receive a transfer.
1.4 Empirical Approach
1.4.1 Data
The data set used in this study is the pilot survey of the China Health and Retirement
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). CHARLS is a broad-purposed social science and
health survey of the elderly in China. It is designed in a similar way as the Health
and Retirement Study in the US. It tries to provide micro-data with comprehensive
coverage and high accuracy for research on aging problem in China. Existing datasets
in China are too specialized, without enough depth of variables. Comparing to them,
CHARLS covers extensive dimensions of the elderly, with detailed variables on health
measures and indicators of the socio-economic status17.
16The detailed derivation of the transfer derivatives is presented in Appendix A.1.
17See Zhao et al. (2009) for detailed description of the data.
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In order to get the extremes within China, the pilot survey of CHARLS focused on
two provinces: Gansu, a poor inland province, and Zhejiang, a rich coastal province18.
In terms of economic development, Gansu is far less developed than Zhejiang. Several
key statistics from the China Statistical Yearbook (2009) are summarized in Table 1,
which shows how different are these two provinces. Gansu is located in the less devel-
oped western inland region. It has been one of the poorest provinces in China with
GDP per capita less than one-third of Zhejiang. Gansu is also one of the most rural
provinces in China with two-thirds of population living in rural areas. In contrast,
Zhejiang is one of the most urbanized provinces in China with nearly 60 percent of its
population living in urban areas. Due to the geographical location and less developed
economy, international trade does not contribute to a big portion of Gansu’s GDP.
The total import and export value is only 13 percent of its GDP. On the contrary,
Zhejiang has become a major center of export with several commercial ports such as
Ningbo and Wenzhou because of its close proximity to Shanghai and high degree of
commercial activities. The total value of foreign import and export in Zhejiang is 68
percent of its GDP.
Apart from significant differences in their economies, Gansu and Zhejiang also
have noteworthy dissimilarity in terms of demographics. Gansu has a far higher
percentage of illiterate population than Zhejiang. As Gansu is less developed, people
are less likely to get education because of economic hardship. Also, people with higher
education are more likely to migrate to other provinces in search of job opportunities.
Gansu also has a lower life expectancy (67 years) than both Zhejiang (74 years) and
the national average (71 years). It is obvious that the degree of economic development
plays a big role on life expectancy. Because of the lower life expectancy, Gansu has a
slightly lower old-aged dependency ratio than Zhejiang. Family size also shows a big
difference between the two provinces. The average family size in Gansu is 3.6 persons
18The full CHARLS will be a national survey and is targeted to be conducted in 2011.
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while the same figure is 2.8 in Zhejiang. This shows that big families with several
generations are still more widespread in Gansu than in Zhejiang.
Households with members aged 45 years or above are included in the sample. The
pilot survey gathered socioeconomic information for a sample of 2,685 individuals
living in 1,570 households. The individuals included the main respondents aged 45
and above from each household and the spouse if there was one19. Information of 4391
children of the respondents has been collected in the survey. The unit of observation
for the analysis in this paper is each pair of child and parent. I exclude the child-
parent pair if the child is under 16 or the child is a full-time student. I further exclude
any child-parent pair if the child lives with the parent because this study focuses on
private transfer from children not living with their parents. With all these exclusions,
the sample size falls to 3020 child-parent pairs in 1205 households, with 1557 pairs in
608 households in Gansu and 1463 pairs in 597 households in Zhejiang.
Considering the vast differences between Gansu and Zhejiang in terms of economic
development and demographics, the pattern of intergenerational transfers in these
two provinces is very likely to vary. Preliminary evidence suggests that households
in Gansu have a higher degree of dependence on transfers from children. To reflect
the importance of transfers to the households, transfers as a percentage of household
income per capita is used. In Gansu, the figure is 67 percent for households that
received transfers while the figure is 59 percent in Zhejiang. Because of the dissim-
ilarity between the two provinces, the analysis in this paper was done separately on
the two provinces in order to contrast them20.
1.4.2 The Determinants of Intergenerational Transfers
The theoretical model showed that pre-transfer income of the recipients would affect
both the transfer decision and the amount of the transfer received. The household pre-
19Spouses can be under 45 years old.
20The analysis for the combined sample of both provinces is presented in Appendix A.2.
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transfer income per capita entered the analysis as the main determinant. Apart from
the pre-transfer income of recipients, donor’s income also affects both the transfer
decision and the transfer amount. Theories developed by Cox (1987) show that both
the probability of making a transfer and the transfer amount will increase with a
raise in donor’s income. Since CHARLS does not provide direct information on the
children’s income, other variables on child’s characteristics are included in the analysis
instead. These variables include the age of child, whether the child is a male, dummies
variables on child’s education level, number of children the child has, whether the
child lives in urban area, whether the child is working, whether the child lives in a
different province than the parents. Cai et al. (2006) also used some similar variables
to capture the effect of donor’s income on private transfers in China21. Variables that
simulate the effect of donor’s income are expected to be positively correlated with
transfer decision and transfer amount.
Several demographic variables of the parents are also included as determinants of
transfer occurrence and transfer amounts. The age of the household head is included
to control the life-cycle effects of the recipients. Household wealth per capita is
also included to capture possible wealth effect on transfers. Dummies variables on
education level of the household head are also included to control the human capital
effect. Gender and marital status of the household head are included since both
may affect the need for financial support from the children. Past studies (Cox, 1987;
Kaufmann and Lindauer, 1986; Lucas and Stark, 1985) found that transfers are more
likely targeted to female head of household. Several variables are included to control
for health status of the household head. The variables include a self-reported health
status, whether the person has any chronic disease, and whether the person has any
physical disability. It is expected that household head with poor health or long
21Cai et al. (2006) claimed that those variables are used to control the size and quality of the
transfer network. The variables included number of living adult children, average education of adult
children, average age of adult children, and number of living siblings.
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term illness will be more likely to receive transfers from the children. The dummy
variable indicating the existence of coresiding adult children are also included as
parents are expected to receive less transfer if some of the adult children coreside
with them. Other children may be less likely to make transfer to the parent because
some of their siblings take up the responsibility to support the parents. The total
number of children and household size are also included. One final variable included
in the analysis is whether the elderly take care of their grandchildren. Taking care of
grandchildren can be seen as the services provided by the elder parents. It is expected
that the parents are more likely to receive transfer in exchange of this service provided
for their children.
Descriptive statistics for all the aforementioned determining variables are reported
in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. Summary statistics of parent characteristics and children
characteristics are reported separately. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of parent
characteristics for each province separated by transfer recipients and non-recipients.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of children characteristics for each province
separated by transfer donors and non-donors. Table 4 and table 5 show the summary
statistics for all households in each province22.
1.4.3 Econometric Methodology
The analysis can be divided into two parts. First, I focus on the transfer decision and
study how the determinants affect the household’s probability of receiving a transfer
from adult children. Second, given that a transfer is received, I examine how the
determinants affect the amount of transfer.
To study the transfer decision, the corresponding equation is defined as follows:
d∗i = b0 + b1Ei + b2X
1
i + µi (1.5)
22The summary statistics for the combined sample of both provinces are presented in Appendix
A.3.
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and
di =
 1⇔ d
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
(1.6)
where households are indexed by i. The latent variable that determines the transfer
receipt is denoted by d∗i , where d
∗
i > 0 if and only if the household reports receiving
a positive transfer from the children (di = 1). If the household does not report
receiving transfer (di = 0), the latent variable is negative or zero. The variable Ei
denotes household’s pre-transfer income. According to the theory, altruistic motive
predicts a negative relationship between recipient’s income and the transfer decision.
The expected sign for the income coefficient b1 in this equation is negative. The vector
X1i includes all other determining variables described in previous section, and µi is
a normally distributed error term with mean zero. As in regular model with binary
dependent variable, equation (1.5) is estimated by a probit model.
The next equation to be estimated is the one for transfer amount. The amount
of transfer received is the dependent variable and the equation is defined as follows:
T ∗i = c0 + c1Ei + c2X
2
i + i (1.7)
and
Ti =
 T
∗
i if di = 1 and T
∗
i > 0
0 if di = 0
(1.8)
where T ∗i is the unobserved latent variable and i is the error term. The actual
observed amount of net transfer received (Ti) equals the unobserved latent variable
only when the household reports receiving net positive transfers (di = 1 and T
∗
i > 0).
Otherwise, transfer received is zero. The vector X2i includes the determining variables
similar to those of the vector X1i with some minor difference which will be discussed
below. Other variables are defined as in (1.5). The main focus of equation (1.7) is
19
the transfer derivative, which is denoted by the coefficient c1.
The censored nature of the transfer amount should be taken into account care-
fully when the equation is estimated. One should notice the fact that not all the
households receive transfers from adult children. It is very unlikely that households
are randomly chosen to receive transfers. Using ordinary least squares to estimate
the transfer amount equation on only households who receive transfer may result in
biased estimation. The tobit model (Tobin, 1958) can be used in order to deal with
the censored nature of the problem. However, the tobit model has its limitation.
Using the tobit model, the estimated coefficients in the transfer decision equation
and those in the transfer amount are proportional. For any given determinant, tobit
model forces it to have the same direction of effect on both the transfer decision and
the amount of transfers. This limitation makes the tobit model a less than ideal
estimation method in the context of transfer behavior.
Instead of the tobit model, the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure should be
used. The transfer decision and the decision on transfer amount were assumed to
be made separately. Estimation using Heckman procedure has a greater flexibility in
the sense that it allows the effect of a given determinant on the transfer decision and
its effect on the transfer amount to be different. In this paper, Heckman two-step
procedure is applied with a probit to model the transfer decision in the first step and
a corrected ordinary least squares to model the transfer amount in the second step.
A major drawback of using Heckman model is the identification issue. An exclusion
restriction is the usual method to obtain identification in a Heckman procedure in
order to have valid results. In particular, an exclusion restriction means that at least
one extra variable should be included and contribute a significant effect in first step
probit but not in the second step corrected ordinary least squares.
Apart from exclusion restrictions, identification can also be obtained by func-
tional form. For example, in Heckman (1979) model, identification can be obtained
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by parameterization of the joint distribution of the error terms in both equations.
Escanciano, Jacho-Chavez and Lewbel (2010) showed that identification based on
function form can be achieved under a semiparametric setting without exclusion re-
strictions23. They claimed that an extra variable in the first stage of Heckman model
is not necessary. In order to achieve identification, one should find some variables
that affect the first stage selection process nonlinearly and affect the second stage
outcome linearly.
To apply the idea of Escanciano et al. (2010), I include the squared term of child’s
age in the first stage probit of my estimation. Child’s age can capture the life-cycle
effects of the child. In particular, people are more likely to face a credit constraint
during young age and during retiring age. With possible binding financial constraints
at both stages, children are less likely to transfer money to their parents. Thus,
the relationship between transfer probability and children’s age are very likely to be
nonlinear. Nonetheless, if they can make a transfer without any financial constraints,
the amount of transfer will be determined by factors other than the children’s age,
such as recipient’s income. To check this assertion, I used locally weighted regression
(lowess) to estimate the non-parametric relationship between transfer probability and
child’s age. It can be seen that the probability-child’s age relationship is an inverted
U-shaped (Figure 1) while a close to flat relationship between transfer amount and
child’s age is found using lowess (Figure 2). Thus, both theory and data show some
evidence in supporting child’s age as the key to obtain identification in my analysis.
1.4.4 Empirical Results
Using CHARLS, I found that intergenerational transfers from children to parents are
widespread in China, at least in Gansu and Zhejiang. Nearly half of the households
received positive net transfers from adult children. Another key finding is that trans-
23See Escanciano et al. (2010) for detailed proof and empirical application.
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fers contribute a significant portion of household income of the elderly. Data showed
that the amount of net transfer received can be as much as two-thirds of household
income per capita. I also found that the pre-transfer income is negatively correlated
with the probability of receiving transfers. This relationship indicates that intergen-
erational transfers in China are targeted to the needy elderly parents. Concerning
about the transfer derivative, pre-transfer income does not have any significant effect
on the transfer amount received.
Apart from intergenerational transfers, the children’s decision of living with the
elderly parents is also analyzed. I found that transfer recipients are less likely to
live with their adult children. It may indicate that money transfers and time-related
care are substitutes from the view of the children. I also found the division of labor
between siblings for parent’s living arrangement. If one of the siblings already took
the responsibility of living with the parents, the other children are less likely to live
with them.
Intergenerational transfers are widespread in the two provinces and the transfers
contribute a significant amount of recipient’s household income. It seems to indicate
that children are the major source of old-age support in China. Table 6 summarized
some of the statistics from CHARLS. For the whole sample, 44.5 percent of households
received transfers from adult children. The figures are 40.1 percent in Gansu and 49
percent in Zhejiang. Focusing on the households that received positive net transfers,
the average amount of net transfer is 2135 yuan in Gansu and 4298 yuan in Zhejiang.
The figure is smaller in Gansu, but this is the result of a much lower GDP per-capita.
Transfers as a percentage of household income per capita would better reflect the
importance of transfers to the households. In Gansu, transfers as a percentage of
household income per capita is 67 percent for households that received transfers. In
Zhejiang, transfers as a percentage of household income per capita is 59 percent for
households received transfers. It seems to suggest that people in Gansu have a higher
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degree of dependence on transfers from children.
The probit results showed that the pre-transfer income is negatively correlated
with the probability of receiving transfers. Probit estimates on net transfer receipts
are presented in Table 7. The coefficients of pre-transfer income on the transfer
probability are significant in both provinces. This negative correlation reveals that
intergenerational transfers in China are targeted to the needy elderly parents. Apart
from the parent’s pre-transfer income, some of their characteristics are also significant
in affecting the probability of getting transfers. Age of household head is found
to be negatively correlated with the transfer probability in both provinces. One
possible explanation is that older parents need more time-related care instead of
money transfer. At the same time, time-related care and money transfers appear to
be substitutes from the view of adult children (See the analysis on children’s decision
of living with the elderly parents). Larger household size also reduced the probability
of receiving a transfer. This may reflect the fact that some children choose to live
with the parents and take up the responsibility of supporting them. This allows other
children to take a lesser role to support their aging parents and they are less likely
to make a transfer as a result. Parents with elementary school or middle school as
the highest level of education are more likely to receive transfers in Zhejiang. Parents
who are widowed or separated are less likely to receive transfers in Gansu. Again,
those parents may need more time-related care instead of money transfers. Finally,
parents having chronic diseases are more likely to receive transfers in Gansu. This
shows that transfers from adult children target more to the needy parents.
Child characteristics also have significant effect on the probability of transfer.
Results showed that child’s age and its squared terms have significant effect in both
Gansu and Zhejiang. Child’s age increases the probability of transfer occurrences,
but at a decreasing rate. Child’s education level also has significant effects on the
probability of transfer. In Gansu, children with elementary school or above are all
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significantly more likely to make a transfer to the parents than children who are
illiterate. In Zhejiang, children whose highest level of education is elementary school
and those whose highest level of education is high school or above are significantly
more likely to make a transfer to the parents than children who are illiterate. A
few more variables about children’s characteristics are significant in affecting the
probability of transfer. In Gansu’s samples, children who are not living in the same
province as the parents are more likely to make a transfer to the parents than those
who live in Gansu. This may indicate that some transfers are remittances from
children working in prosperous provinces to the parents in the less wealthy Gansu.
In Zhejiang, children who are working are more like to make a transfer to the parents
than those who are not.
Next, I focus on the estimation of transfer amount received by the households.
The dependent variable for the following analysis is the amount of net transfer from a
particular child to the parents who received transfer. Table 8 presents the estimates
separated by province. For each province, two sets of estimation are reported. The
first set of estimation is Heckman procedure applying the idea of Escanciano et al.
(2010). The second set of estimation is OLS with all variables included for comparison
purpose. Some differences in magnitude can be found among the two sets of estimates
but they generally have the same direction.
The main focus of the result is the transfer derivative. It indicates how much
the transfer amount changes in response to a dollar increase in pre-transfer income.
For Gansu, all estimated transfer derivatives are negative but not significant. For
Zhejiang, the estimated transfer derivatives are positive but not significant. For the
purpose of testing the transfer motive, the result does not seem to support either the
altruistic motive or the exchange motive. However, one should note that these results
need to be considered thoroughly due to the limitation of CHARLS. Similar to some
previous studies, the dataset does not have information on donor’s income, which is
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the child’s income in this study. According to the transfer theories, donor’s income is
positively correlated with transfer amount. If children’s income and parent’s income
are positively correlated as found in previous literature24, omitting children’s income
from the analysis will cause some degrees of positive bias on the parent’s income
coefficients. This may explain why the estimations of income coefficients are not
significant in the second stage regression because the bias may make it less negative
or even positive.
Significant effect on the transfer amount was also found in a few variables. For
example, sons give a significant higher amount of transfer than daughters by around
550 yuan in Gansu. This may reflect the patrilineal tendency in Gansu in which
sons, more so than daughters, are viewed as the major source of old age support.
Adult children having one extra of their own child transfer around 370 yuan less
to their parents in Gansu. It seems that having their own children may constrain
adult children’s support to their parent. Education level of both parents and children
also affect the transfer amount in Gansu. Children with less than elementary school
education transfer about 1500 yuan less to the parents than children who are illiterate.
Parents with elementary school education receive about 1000 yuan less than parents
who are illiterate. In Zhejiang, children with high school or above education level
give around 2500 yuan more to the parents than children who are illiterate. Also,
children who are working give about 800 yuan more to the parents than children who
are not. Household size has a significant negative effect on the transfer amount for
Zhejiang with a coefficient of around 200 yuan. Again, children living with parents
allow other siblings to take a lesser role to support their aging parents and transfer
less money to them. The household head being a female is negatively correlated with
the transfer amount for Zhejiang. This contradicts the findings of previous literature.
One possible explanation is that female household head is very likely a widow. A
24For example, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) found that intergeneration income correla-
tion in the U.S. was at least 0.4.
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single elderly needs adult children to live with her and take care of her more than
money transfers.
It is very common in China that some adult children choose to live with the parents
in order to provide time-related care. For example, half of the sampled households
in CHARLS have at least one adult child living with the elderly parents. Apart from
money transfers, time-related care is a big demand of elderly parents. As discussed
above, it is possible that money transfers and time-related care are substitutes from
the view of the children. The following analysis on time-related care can shed some
light on money transfers.
It seems that money transfer and time-related transfer are substitutes in some
sense. By separating the households according to whether they received net money
transfers from the children, I found that transfer recipients are less likely to live with
their adult children (Table 9). Only 40 percent of transfer recipients are living with at
least one adult child. The percentage is 57 percent for non-recipients. More parents
living with adult children also result in a larger household size (Row 2 of Table 9).
One possible explanation is that having less adult children may constrain the kind of
transfers the elderly receive. Thus, elderly either lives with adult children or receive
money transfer from them if the parents do not have enough adult children who are
capable to provide both. This seems to be the case in CHARLS as non-recipients
households have an average of 3 children while transfer recipients households have 3.4
children.
Table 9 also shows some differences on the likelihood of adult children living with
their elderly parents between the two provinces. For both transfer recipients and
non-recipients, a higher percentage of households in Gansu have adult children as
household members than that in Zhejiang. Households in Gansu also have a larger
household size and more children. Traditionally, people in China expect sons instead
of daughters to provide old-age support. Having more children may guarantee at least
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one of them is a son and the old-age support from the child. By having more children,
a higher percentage of households in Gansu have at least one son than households in
Zhejiang.
The probit estimates on adult children’s living arrangement are presented in Table
10. The dependent variable of this analysis is whether the child lives with the parent.
Children who are 16 or above and not full-time students are included in the analysis.
A similar set of determining variables is used as in the transfer regressions. Several
variables have been found to have a significant effect on adult children’s likelihood
of living with parents. One factor that has a large significant effect is whether other
siblings live with the parents. If other siblings choose to live with the parents, the
adult child will be less likely to live with them. The marginal effects are -0.21 in Gansu
and -0.15 in Zhejiang. It shows that a division of labor exists between siblings. Data
also showed that sons are more likely to live with the parents as daughter is more
likely to follow husband’s family rather than staying with her own parents. Young
children are also found to be more likely to live with the parents. The reason is that
older siblings are more likely to have their own families and choose to live away from
the parents. Parent’s need is also a significant factor as those who are widowed or
separated are more likely to live with adult children.
1.5 Discussion
The uniqueness of CHALRS pilot dataset enables us to analyze a two-province case
study for China. In this section, the differences between the two provinces and the
source of these differences are discussed. I will also discuss several theoretical hy-
potheses on the transfer motives.
Results revealed differences in the transfer pattern between Gansu and Zhejiang.
A possible source of these differences is tradition. In Chinese tradition, supporting
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parents is always viewed as the responsibility of the children. This responsibility is
more likely to fall on sons because of patrilineal ideal (Lee, Parish and Willis, 1994).
Patrilineal ideal in Chinese families means that daughters leave their origin family to
become part of the husband’s family at the time of marriage. The right to the daugh-
ters’ labor and reproduction also transfers to the husband’s family at the same time.
Literature suggested that patrilineal ideal tends to fade with economic development
(Lee et al., 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997). Gansu is a poor inland province in China,
while Zhejiang is a rich coastal province. Besides, as reflected by the international
trade as percentage of GDP in both provinces, Gansu has less interaction with the
Western world compared to Zhejiang. We should expect that Gansu’s people are
less affected by Western culture than their counterparts in Zhejiang. Combining the
lower level of economic development and fewer contact of Western culture, people in
Gansu are expected to hold Chinese tradition such as patrilineal ideal more strictly
than people in Zhejiang.
Three hypothetical questions in CHARLS show how different the two provinces
are in terms of traditional family value. Respondents were asked about their opinion
on living arrangement and old-age support for elderly people. Table 11 presents the
results on these questions. A substantial difference between the two provinces can
be seen on the opinion on whether living with children is the best arrangement for
elderly people. Similar result is also found on whether the respondent thinks that she
can rely on her children for old-age support25. People in Gansu view their children as
the best option of living arrangement and old-age support while people in Zhejiang
depend more on themselves. These results, to a certain extent, show that people in
Gansu are more traditional than people in Zhejiang.
Empirical results are consistent with the argument of tradition differences. For
example, households in Gansu have a higher degree of dependence on parental sup-
25Statistical tests on the equality of proportions show significant difference between Gansu and
Zhejiang.
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port. Data showed that transfers as a percentage of household income per capita is
67 percent for households received transfers in Gansu while the figure is 59 percent in
Zhejiang. In terms of living arrangement, CHARLS showed that a higher percentage
of elderly in Gansu are living with adult children than those in Zhejiang. A larger
degree of patrilineal tendency is also found in Gansu. Data showed that the size
of transfers given by sons is significantly larger than daughters in Gansu. Also, the
percentage of households with at least one son is higher in Gansu than in Zhejiang.
Thus, an ample amount of evidence has been found in support of tradition as one of
the forces behind intergenerational transfers in China.
Results showed that households with less income are more likely to receive trans-
fers from their children in both provinces. It indicates that intergenerational transfers
in China are targeted to poorer households. The reason is that people care about the
well-being of their elderly parents. If the income of the parents is low, the children
will be more likely to transfer money to the parents in order for them to achieve a
certain level of consumption, which is optimal from the children’s view. According to
the theories of transfer motives, both altruism and exchange models predict a nega-
tive correlation between recipient’s income and the probability of receiving a transfer.
Only the sign of transfer derivative in the second stage regression of transfer amount
can indicate whether the motive is altruism or exchange. Nonetheless, all estimated
transfer derivatives in the second stage regression are not significant. It seems that
there is not enough evidence to support only one motive.
Apart from altruistic motive and exchange motive, other hypotheses have been
proposed. One of the alternative theories is “parental repayment hypothesis” (Lil-
lard and Willis, 1997). Under this hypothesis, individuals have difficulties to borrow
against their future income due to the existence of borrowing constraints. Instead, fi-
nancing goes through an implicit family capital market. In particular, parents provide
support for children’s education through both grant and loan when the children are
29
young26. When the parents approach retiring age, the children repay the loan to the
parents through providing old-age support. According to this hypothesis, a positive
relationship is expected between the children’s level of education and the transfers
they give to their parents. Evidence supporting parental repayment hypothesis is also
found in the data. Results showed that children with higher education level are more
likely to give transfers to parents compare to children who are illiterate. Also, in Zhe-
jiang province, children who are high school graduates or above give larger transfer
to the parents than children who are illiterate. The results provide some evidence to
support the parental repayment hypothesis.
1.6 Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to investigate how the income of elderly and other
factors affect the intergenerational transfers from adult children in China. Due to
the lack of high quality datasets, previous studies on China’s private transfer cannot
differentiate intragenerational transfers from intergenerational transfers. Using the
pilot survey of CHARLS, this paper is the first to solely focus on intergenerational
transfers from children to parents in China.
A number of key findings have been obtained in this paper. First, intergenerational
transfers from children to parents are very widespread in China, at least in the two
provinces I focus on. Around half of the households received positive net transfer from
the children. Second, children are the major source of old-age support in China. Data
showed that the amount of net transfer received is at most two-thirds of household
income per capita. Third, parental support is responsive to the income level of the
elderly as households with lower income are more likely to receive transfers from the
children.
26There exists some evidence of education investment paid by parents. For example, Brown and
Park (2002) found that children from poor and credit constrained families are more likely to drop
out of school.
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Significant differences between the two provinces on transfer patterns are also
found. Results showed that people in Gansu have a higher degree of dependence
on adult children. Data and people’s opinion both suggested that Gansu’s people
are more likely to view the adult children as the major source of providing old-age
support and living arrangement.
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. Considering the
rapidly increasing old-age population in China and the significant contribution of
intergenerational transfers in old-age support, providing parental support will be a
massive burden for future generation in China. Appropriate public old-age policy
would provide sustainable old-age support for the elderly and lessen the burden for
young adults. This policy is especially crucial for poor and traditional provinces like
Gansu since elderly in those area have a higher degree of dependence on intergener-
ational transfers.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Key Statistics of China and the two provinces in the year of 2008
China Gansu Zhejiang
GDP per capita (yuan) 22698 12085.65 41966.64
Population (10000 persons) 132802 2628 5120
GDP (billion yuan) 30067 317.61 2148.69
Total import and export as % of GDP 59.21% 13.33% 68.24%
Urban population (10000 persons) 60667 845 2949
Urban proportion 45.68% 32.15% 57.60%
Rural population (10000 persons) 72135 1783 2171
Rural proportion 54.32% 67.85% 42.40%
Percentage of illiterate population total aged 15 and overb 7.77% 17.77% 9.38%
Population life expectancy in 2000c 71.4 67.47 74.7
Old-aged dependency ratio (aged 65 and over) 13.04% 11.47% 14.14%
Average Family size 3.16 3.6 2.81
a Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009)
b Illiterate population in this table refers to the population aged 15 and over who are unable or have difficulty
in reading.
c Life expectancy in 2000 by region is calculated from the death data of 2000’s National Population Census,
further adjusted by the mortality rates from the annual national sample surveys on population changes
since 1990.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of parent characteristics
Gansu Zhejiang
Recipients Non-Recipients Recipients Non-Recipients
Net transfer received per child 878.8 (1775.76) — 1950.47 (4532.76) —
Total net transfer received 2135.59 (4436.39) — 4298.64 (9482.92) —
Avg. household income (000’s
yuan)
3.195 (5.341) 4.411 (10.466) 7.227 (12.338) 12.877 (35.716)
Avg. household wealth (000’s
yuan)
24.274 (94.353) 21.847 (94.968) 93.342 (217.495) 78.118(199.391)
Age 63.03 (9.33) 62.15 (10.06) 66.86 (9.51) 63.26 (10.39)
Female household head 0.5574 (0.4978) 0.5 (0.5007) 0.611 (0.4884) 0.5494 (0.4984)
Number of children 3.56 (1.44) 3.18 (1.47) 3.34 (1.5) 2.79 (1.45)
At least 1 adult child lives
with parents
0.455 (0.499) 0.6044 (0.4897) 0.355 (0.4794) 0.5362 (0.4996)
Illiterate 0.5656 (0.4968) 0.5303 (0.4998) 0.4471 (0.4981) 0.4573 (0.499)
Less than elementary school 0.1271 (0.3338) 0.1402 (0.3476) 0.2663 (0.4428) 0.2764 (0.448)
Elementary school 0.1025 (0.3039) 0.1429 (0.3505) 0.1775 (0.3828) 0.1382 (0.3457)
Middle school 0.1271 (0.3338) 0.0935 (0.2915) 0.0751 (0.264) 0.0823 (0.2752)
High school of above 0.0779 (0.2686) 0.0935 (0.2915) 0.0342 (0.1819) 0.0461 (0.21)
Household head is married 0.6886 (0.4641) 0.7391 (0.4398) 0.669 (0.4714) 0.75 (0.4338)
Poor health 0.5164 (0.5008) 0.511 (0.5006) 0.2902 (0.4546) 0.25 (0.4338)
Disability 0.1927 (0.3952) 0.1869 (0.3903) 0.0956 (0.2945) 0.0889 (0.285)
Chronic diseases 0.7664 (0.424) 0.6759 (0.4688) 0.6451 (0.4794) 0.5658 (0.4965)
Household size 3.25 (1.64) 3.65 (1.74) 2.49 (1.36) 2.99 (1.53)
Take care of grandchildren 0.2746 (0.4473) 0.1347 (0.3418) 0.1741 (0.3799) 0.1415 (0.3491)
Number of households 244 364 293 304
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of children characteristics
Gansu Zhejiang
Donors Non-Donors Donors Non-Donors
Net transfer given 1249.54 (3268.87) — 1988.82 (6072.88) —
Male 0.5303 (0.4997) 0.4153 (0.493) 0.4867 (0.5003) 0.4457 (0.4974)
Age 36.26 (9.32) 36.74 (9.86) 41.25 (9.31) 39.29 (10.11)
Illiterate 0.1 (0.3004) 0.2219 (0.4157) 0.0914 (0.2884) 0.1293 (0.3357)
Less than elementary school 0.0559 (0.2299) 0.1012 (0.3017) 0.0882 (0.2838) 0.087 (0.282)
Elementary school 0.2163 (0.4122) 0.1979 (0.3986) 0.2851 (0.4518) 0.2513 (0.434)
Middle school 0.3396 (0.4742) 0.2627 (0.4403) 0.2898 (0.4541) 0.3261 (0.4691)
High school of above 0.2884 (0.4536) 0.2166 (0.4121) 0.2457 (0.4309) 0.2066 (0.4051)
Living in urban area 0.3954 (0.4895) 0.2884 (0.4533) 0.3008 (0.459) 0.3298 (0.4704)
Is working 0.8419 (0.3653) 0.8492 (0.3581) 0.8221 (0.3828) 0.767 (0.4231)
Num. of children the child has 1.46 (1.09) 1.68 (1.15) 1.35 (0.83) 1.32 (0.9)
Live in a diff. province 0.2535 (0.4356) 0.1775 (0.3823) 0.0693 (0.2542) 0.0882 (0.2838)
Parents provided childcare 0.128 (0.3344) 0.0728 (0.2599) 0.0835 (0.2769) 0.081 (0.2729)
Number of observations 430 1227 635 828
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics of parent characteristics: all households
Gansu Zhejiang
Net transfer received per child 352.68 (1203.42) 957.27 (3319.41)
Total net transfer received 857.05 (2996.11) 2109.72 (6977.34)
Percentage of recipients 0.4014 (0.4906) 0.4908 (0.5004)
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) 3.9233 (8.7912) 10.1044 (27.0394)
Avg. household wealth (000’s yuan) 22.8216 (94.6514) 85.5901 (208.4372)
Age 62.5 (9.78) 65.03 (10.12)
Female household head 0.5231 (0.4999) 0.5796 (0.4941)
Number of children 3.33 (1.47) 3.06 (1.5)
At least 1 adult child lives with parents 0.5445 (0.4985) 0.4473 (0.4977)
Illiterate 0.5445 (0.4985) 0.4523 (0.4982)
Less than elementary school 0.1349 (0.3419) 0.2714 (0.4451)
Elementary school 0.1267 (0.3329) 0.1575 (0.3646)
Middle school 0.107 (0.3093) 0.0788 (0.2696)
High school of above 0.0872 (0.2824) 0.0403 (0.1966)
Household head is married 0.7188 (0.45) 0.7103 (0.4541)
Poor health 0.5132 (0.5003) 0.2697 (0.4442)
Disability 0.1892 (0.392) 0.0922 (0.2895)
Chronic diseases 0.7122 (0.4532) 0.6047 (0.4894)
Household size 3.49 (1.71) 2.75 (1.47)
Take care of grandchildren 0.1908 (0.3933) 0.1575 (0.3646)
Number of households 608 597
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.5: Summary statistics of children characteristics: all households
Gansu Zhejiang
Net transfer given 345.09 (1805.1) 863.23 (4118.9)
Percentage of donors 0.2762 (0.4473) 0.4341 (0.4958)
Male 0.4471 (0.4974) 0.4635 (0.4989)
Age 36.6 (9.72) 40.14 (9.82)
Illiterate 0.1882 (0.391) 0.1128 (0.3165)
Less than elementary school 0.0887 (0.2844) 0.0875 (0.2827)
Elementary school 0.203 (0.4024) 0.2659 (0.442)
Middle school 0.2839 (0.4511) 0.3104 (0.4628)
High school of above 0.2364 (0.425) 0.2236 (0.4168)
Living in urban area 0.318 (0.4659) 0.3172 (0.4656)
Is working 0.8472 (0.36) 0.7909 (0.4069)
Num. of children the child has 1.62 (1.14) 1.33 (0.87)
Live in a diff. province 0.1985 (0.399) 0.08 (0.2714)
Parents provided childcare 0.088 (0.2834) 0.0821 (0.2745)
Number of observations 1557 1463
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.6: Key statistics of intergenerational transfers in CHARLS
All households Household who received transfers
Both Both
provinces Gansu Zhejiang provinces Gansu Zhejiang
% of transfer recipients 44.57% 40.14% 49.08% — — —
Total net transfer received 1477.66 857.05 2109.72 3315.8 2135.59 4298.64
Pre-transfer household income per
capita
6985.5 3923.3 10104.4 5395.2 3195.4 7227.2
% of net transfer as household income
per capita
21.15% 21.84% 20.87% 61.45% 66.83% 59.47%
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
Table 1.7: Probit estimates of net transfer receipts from children to parents
Gansu Zhejiang
Income
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) -0.0047 (0.0025)* -0.0059 (0.0018)***
Parents’ characteristics
Avg. household wealth (000’s yuan) 0.0003 (0.0001)** 0.0002 (0.0001)*
Age -0.0054 (0.0025)** -0.0101 (0.0037)***
Female household head -0.0349 (0.0338) 0.0114 (0.0476)
Number of children 0.0011 (0.0114) 0.0174 (0.0175)
At least 1 adult child lives with parents -0.0434 (0.042) -0.0019 (0.0611)
Less than elementary school -0.0395 (0.0452) 0.0469 (0.0531)
Elementary school -0.0197 (0.0529) 0.1081 (0.0661)
Middle school 0.017 (0.0514) 0.1747 (0.0952)*
High school or above -0.0119 (0.0639) 0.072 (0.1249)
Household head is married 0.0749 (0.034)** 0.0364 (0.0515)
Poor health 0.0107 (0.0311) -0.0192 (0.0493)
Disability 0.0297 (0.0401) 0.0286 (0.0782)
Chronic diseases 0.0621 (0.0334)* 0.0401 (0.043)
Household size -0.0243 (0.0126)* -0.0368 (0.022)*
Take care of grandchildren 0.0731 (0.0472) 0.0214 (0.0575)
Child’s characteristics
Male 0.0275 (0.0251) -0.023 (0.0328)
Age 0.0298 (0.0092)*** 0.0441 (0.0137)***
Age squared -0.0003 (0.0001)** -0.0004 (0.0002)**
Less than elementary school 0.0038 (0.0535) 0.0811 (0.0766)
Elementary school 0.1433 (0.051)*** 0.1225 (0.0642)*
Middle school 0.1543 (0.0526)*** 0.0732 (0.0708)
High school or above 0.1621 (0.0562)*** 0.1639 (0.077)**
Living in urban area 0.0307 (0.0343) -0.0233 (0.0391)
Is working -0.0231 (0.0404) 0.09 (0.0398)**
Num. of children the child has -0.0132 (0.0168) -0.0124 (0.024)
Live in a diff. province 0.0798 (0.0368)** -0.0066 (0.056)
Number of Observations 1557 1463
a Robust standard errors (standard errors are clustered by household to correct possible correlation among resid-
uals) are reported in parentheses.
b Marginal effects instead of the coefficients are reported.
c ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.8: Regression estimates of net transfer amount received from children to
parents
Gansu Zhejiang
Heckman OLS Heckman OLS
Income
Avg. household in-
come (000’s yuan)
-7.94 (21.51) -10.3 (22.31) 19.69 (28.94) 18.67 (29.24)
Parents’ characteris-
tics
Avg. household assets
(000’s yuan)
1.58 (1.23) 1.71 (1.34) 2.02 (1.27) 2.03 (1.29)
Age -17.09 (29.35) -20.44 (27.9) -70.93 (44.5) -81.18 (53.02)
Female household head -285.6 (322.23) -305.04 (311.25) -1498.61 (823.58)* -1492.8 (836.39)*
Number of children -111.68 (90.57) -110.48 (91.8) -10.79 (154.8) 0.26 (160.7)
At least 1 adult child
lives with parents
-126.15 (262.72) -149.85 (267.23) 374.13 (543.37) 365.29 (558.21)
Less than elementary
school
330.75 (504.76) 304.15 (539.41) 919.6 (613.91) 899.07 (595.62)
Elementary school -1041.22 (321.98)*** -1058.76 (359.73)*** -107.7 (779.53) -108.2 (811.23)
Middle school -738.5 (399.07)* -736.58 (417.43)* -1652 (985.13)* -1533.29 (955.08)
High school or above 81.5 (548.72) 68.36 (587.4) -2758.18 (1405.98)* -2798.54 (1484.14)*
Household head is
married
496.48 (411.72) 532.47 (435.12) 598.2 (442.42) 609.01 (454.89)
Poor health 144.44 (338.64) 148.88 (350.63) 11.32 (348.59) 37.17 (358.77)
Disability -363.57 (348.26) -352.07 (358) -503.26 (462.11) -485.95 (460.67)
Chronic diseases 97.5 (321.58) 124.4 (332.29) -1072.35 (640.47)* -1085.02 (669.69)
Household size 26.22 (65.34) 13.69 (74.08) -234.31 (139.25)* -261.64 (144.9)*
Take care of grandchil-
dren
544.43 (571.51) 565.05 (591.76) -1307.28 (909.54) -1306.43 (931.31)
Child’s characteristics
Male 550.33 (248.88)** 561.62 (260.23)** 790.84 (591.22) 767.69 (584.19)
Age 12.85 (30.19) 45.26 (135.62) 10.36 (24.05) 125.28 (198.79)
Age squared — -0.36 (1.65) — -1.26 (2.1)
Less than elementary
school
-1502.49 (581.72)** -1514.01 (634.31)** -103.27 (456.39) -75.85 (463.71)
Elementary school -730.52 (543.3) -668.72 (558.91) -215.46 (364.06) -189.11 (364.75)
Middle school -320.22 (517.24) -257.49 (539.6) -276.07 (484.14) -250.35 (491.67)
High school or above -376.79 (648.91) -310.72 (665.63) 2463.63 (1026.75)** 2552.65 (1134.27)**
Living in urban area 234.85 (307.27) 251.43 (333.42) 42.03 (690.49) 55.22 (682.34)
Is working -347.19 (380.32) -368.94 (382.28) 778.57 (346.64)** 783.92 (351.58)**
Num. of children the
child has
-369.39 (165.28)** -382.59 (188.85)** 225.19 (426.76) 228.52 (444.06)
Live in a diff. province 394.76 (474.75) 442.49 (552.7) 485.4 (712.53) 496.86 (728)
Number of Observa-
tions
430 430 635 635
a Robust standard errors (standard errors are clustered by household to correct possible correlation among residuals) are reported in
parentheses.
b ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 1.9: Key statistics of children living with elderly parents in CHARLS
Non-recipients Money transfers recipients
Both Both
provinces Gansu Zhejiang provinces Gansu Zhejiang
% of households with at least 1 adult
child living with parents
57.33% 60.44% 53.62% 40.03% 45.50% 35.50%
Household size 3.34 3.64 2.99 2.84 3.25 2.49
Number of children 2.99 3.17 2.79 3.44 3.56 3.34
% of households with at least 1 son 90.7% 92.85% 88.15% 92.73% 97.13% 89.07%
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
Table 1.10: Probit estimates of children living with parents
Gansu Zhejiang
Income
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) -0.0021 (0.0015) 0.0011 (0.0005)**
Parents’ characteristics
Avg. household assets (000’s yuan) -0.000009 (0.0001) 0.000049 (0.000041)
Age 0.0029 (0.0016)* 0.0034 (0.0023)
Female household head -0.0224 (0.0197) -0.0064 (0.0242)
Number of children -0.026 (0.0062)*** -0.0307 (0.0121)**
Other siblings live with parents -0.2134 (0.0262)*** -0.1517 (0.0313)***
Less than elementary school -0.0181 (0.0247) 0.026 (0.0322)
Elementary school 0.0252 (0.0309) 0.0108 (0.0319)
Middle school -0.0323 (0.0276) -0.046 (0.0383)
High school or above 0.0923 (0.0525)** 0.0035 (0.0556)
Household head is married -0.1559 (0.0259)*** -0.2007 (0.034)***
Poor health -0.0295 (0.0181)* 0.0168 (0.0289)
Disability 0.017 (0.0216) 0.0097 (0.0499)
Chronic diseases 0.008 (0.0203) -0.0078 (0.0227)
Household size 0.099 (0.0067)*** 0.1196 (0.0089)***
Take care of grandchildren 0.1201 (0.036)*** 0.179 (0.0403)***
Child’s characteristics
Male 0.1903 (0.0195)*** 0.1972 (0.0251)***
Age -0.0233 (0.0063)*** -0.0581 (0.0081)***
Age squared 0.0002 (0.0001)** 0.0006 (0.0001)***
Less than elementary school -0.0164 (0.0294) -0.0269 (0.0578)
Elementary school 0.0059 (0.0307) -0.0773 (0.0428)*
Middle school 0.0002 (0.0274) -0.0634 (0.0424)
High school or above -0.0094 (0.0285) -0.1015 (0.0396)**
Is working -0.1299 (0.0323)*** -0.0364 (0.0273)
Num. of children the child has -0.066 (0.012)*** -0.0358 (0.0185)*
Number of Observations 2014 1927
a Robust standard errors (standard errors are clustered by household to correct possible correlation among residuals)
are reported in parentheses.
b Marginal effects instead of the coefficients are reported.
c ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.11: Opinions on living arrangement and old-age support for elderly people
Gansu Zhejiang
Question 1: Suppose an elderly person has a spouse and children.
What do you think is the best living arrangement for the elderly person?
(a) Alone or with spouse 46.97% 61.77%
(b) Live with adult children 48.62% 35.75%
(c) Live in a nursing house 3.67% 1.95%
(d) Other 0.73% 0.53%
Question 2: Suppose an elderly person has no spouse but has children.
What do you think is the best living arrangement for the elderly person?
(a) Alone or with spouse 18.93% 39.26%
(b) Live with adult children 74.08% 55.63%
(c) Live in a nursing house 6.07% 4.23%
(d) Other 0.92% 0.88%
Question 3: Whom do you think you can rely on for old-age support?
(a) Children 81.94% 76.90%
(b) Savings 3.91% 5.82%
(c) Pension and retirement salary 10.61% 14.11%
(d) Commercial pension insurance 0% 0.18%
(e) Others 3.54% 3.00%
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
Figure 1.1: The event of receiving transfers as a function of children’s age.
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Figure 1.2: Net amount of transfer received as a function of children’s age.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Comparative Statics Result
The model has the parent’s utility function as follows:
U = U(Cp, V ) (1.A.1.1)
and child’s utility function as follows:
V = V (Ck, U) (1.A.1.2)
together with the following budget constraint:
Ci = Ei + Ti, i = p, k (1.A.1.3)
The analysis focuses on the second period where the kid makes the transfer to the
parent. Thus, the model becomes the child’s maximization problem. A final con-
straint must be introduced into the maximization problem. By being linked to the
child, change in parent’s utility must be nonnegative. This nonnegativity constraint
is as follows:
U(Cp, V ) ≥ U0(Ep, V ) (1.A.1.4)
where U0 denotes the parent’s “threat point” utility level. By substituting the budget
constraint into utility function, the Lagrangian for the child’s maximization problem
is as follows:
L = V (Ek − Tp, U(Ep − Tp, V¯ )) + λ[U(Ep + Tp, V¯ )− U0(Ep, V¯ )] (1.A.1.5)
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The child’s problem is to choose the transfer to parent (Tp) to maximize (1.A.1.5).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the following:
∂L
∂Tp
= −Vc + VuUc + λUc ≤ 0, Tp ∂L
∂Tp
= 0 (1.A.1.6)
∂L
∂λ
= U(Ep + Tp, V¯ )− U0(Ep, V¯ ) ≥ 0, λ∂L
∂λ
= 0 (1.A.1.7)
Assume there exists interior solutions for Tp and the utility gain for the parent is
strictly positive, the condition (1.A.1.7) is not binding, meaning λ = 0. Thus, trans-
fers are used to equate the child’s marginal utility of consumption (Vc) with the par-
ent’s marginal utility of consumption from the child’s point of view (VuUc). Condition
(1.A.1.6) becomes the following:
∂L
∂Tp
= −Vc + VuUc = 0 (1.A.1.8)
Differentiation of condition (1.A.1.8) results the following:
AdTp = B (1.A.1.9)
where
A = Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc (1.A.1.10)
B = VccdEk + VucUcdEp − VuuU2c dEp − VuUccdEp (1.A.1.11)
We can then obtain the following:
dTp
dEk
=
Vcc + VucUc
dEp
dEk
− VuuU2c dEpdEk − VuUcc
dEp
dEk
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
=
Vcc
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
(1.A.1.12)
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dTp
dEp
=
Vcc
dEk
dEp
+ VucUc − VuuU2c − VuUcc
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
=
VucUc − VuuU2c − VuUcc
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
(1.A.1.13)
The following equality can be obtained:
dTp
dEp
− dTp
dEk
=
VucUc − VuuU2c − VuUcc
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
− Vcc
Vcc − VucUc + VuuU2c + VuUcc
= −1
(1.A.1.14)
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1.A.2 Estimation Results for the combined sample of both
provinces
Table 1.A.2.1: Probit estimates of net transfer receipts from children to parents
Income
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) -0.0048 (0.0013)***
Parents’ characteristics
Avg. household wealth (000’s yuan) 0.0002 (0.0001)***
Age -0.0055 (0.0021)***
Female household head 0.0014 (0.0296)
Number of children 0.0039 (0.0101)
At least 1 adult child lives with parents -0.0219 (0.0357)
Less than elementary school 0.0197 (0.0366)
Elementary school 0.045 (0.0436)
Middle school 0.0731 (0.0512)
High school or above 0.0181 (0.0612)
Household head is married 0.0623 (0.0304)**
Poor health -0.0222 (0.0282)
Disability 0.0095 (0.0382)
Chronic diseases 0.0475 (0.028)*
Household size -0.0428 (0.0113)***
Take care of grandchildren 0.0643 (0.0374)*
Child’s characteristics
Male 0.0006 (0.0209)
Age 0.0335 (0.0081)***
Age squared -0.0003 (0.0001)***
Less than elementary school 0.0525 (0.0486)
Elementary school 0.1503 (0.041)***
Middle school 0.1224 (0.0434)***
High school or above 0.1446 (0.0471)***
Living in urban area -0.0038 (0.0265)
Is working 0.0322 (0.0286)
Num. of children the child has -0.0376 (0.0148)**
Live in a diff. province 0.0404 (0.0313)
Number of Observations 3020
a Robust standard errors (standard errors are clustered by household to correct possible correlation
among residuals) are reported in parentheses.
b Marginal effects instead of the coefficients are reported.
c ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 1.A.2.2: Regression estimates of net transfer amount received from children to
parents
Heckman OLS
Income
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) 17.71 (21.91) 16.35 (21.68)
Parents’ characteristics
Avg. household assets (000’s yuan) 1.97 (1.17)* 2 .00(1.19)*
Age -32.33 (24.87) -37.18 (27.41)
Female household head -831.44 (439.26)* -837.4 (449.28)*
Number of children -118.87 (99.81) -114.86 (101.25)
At least 1 adult child lives with parents 147.6 (343.13) 136.47 (348.05)
Less than elementary school 792.2 (501.67) 774.48 (494.98)
Elementary school -303.62 (514.68) -316.91 (535.39)
Middle school -1210.43 (494.24)** -1188.48 (491.63)**
High school or above -1277.83 (740.67)* -1293.8 (766.62)*
Household head is married 482.41 (305.9) 500.14 (314.33)
Poor health -46.46 (245.11) -41.47 (250.12)
Disability -429.34 (231.79)* -427.71 (235.73)*
Chronic diseases -684.96 (410.63)* -687.45 (421.13)
Household size -134.05 (89.11) -155.11 (98.02)
Take care of grandchildren -260.78 (493.52) -260.83 (502.68)
Child’s characteristics
Male 690.98 (336.82)** 688.22 (339.11)**
Age 16.5 (18.57) 75.26 (94.57)
Age squared — -0.66 (0.98)
Less than elementary school -473.83 (354.59) -476.55 (361.9)
Elementary school -276.26 (283.66) -255.88 (287.89)
Middle school -50.85 (324.21) -37.07 (327.77)
High school or above 1332.06 (639.76)** 1356.07 (650.47)**
Living in urban area 248.23 (370.21) 254.18 (371.71)
Is working 256.75 (225.91) 252.54 (225.46)
Num. of children the child has -86.23 (205.71) -106.29 (196.65)
Live in a diff. province 453.68 (430.09) 493.5 (451.92)
Number of Observations 1065 1065
a Robust standard errors (standard errors are clustered by household to correct possible correlation
among residuals) are reported in parentheses.
b ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5%
level, and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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1.A.3 Summary statistics for the combined sample of both
provinces
Table 1.A.3.1: Summary statistics of parent characteristics
All households Recipients Non-Recipients
Net transfer received per child 652.21 (2505.18) 1463.53 (3592.74) —
Total net transfer received 1477.67 (5386.77) 3315.8 (7685.98) —
Percentage of recipients 0.4457 (0.4973) — —
Avg. household income (000’s yuan) 6.9856 (20.2594) 5.3952 (9.9955) 8.2642 (25.6306)
Avg. household wealth (000’s yuan) 53.9193 (164.3438) 61.9595 (176.0431) 47.4558 (154.1276)
Age 63.75 (10.03) 65.12 (9.61) 62.66 (10.22)
Female household head 0.5511 (0.4976) 0.5866 (0.493) 0.5225 (0.4999)
Number of children 3.2 (1.49) 3.44 (1.47) 3 (1.47)
At least 1 adult child lives with parents 0.4963 (0.5002) 0.4004 (0.4905) 0.5734 (0.495)
Illiterate 0.4988 (0.5003) 0.501 (0.5005) 0.4971 (0.5004)
Less than elementary school 0.2025 (0.4021) 0.203 (0.4026) 0.2021 (0.4019)
Elementary school 0.142 (0.3492) 0.1434 (0.3508) 0.1408 (0.348)
Middle school 0.093 (0.2905) 0.0987 (0.2986) 0.0884 (0.284)
High school or above 0.064 (0.2447) 0.0541 (0.2263) 0.0719 (0.2585)
Household head is married 0.7146 (0.4519) 0.6779 (0.4678) 0.7441 (0.4368)
Poor health 0.3926 (0.4886) 0.393 (0.4889) 0.3923 (0.4887)
Disability 0.1411 (0.3483) 0.1397 (0.347) 0.1423 (0.3496)
Chronic diseases 0.659 (0.4743) 0.7002 (0.4587) 0.6258 (0.4843)
Household size 3.12 (1.64) 2.84 (1.54) 3.35 (1.68)
Take care of grandchildren 0.1743 (0.3796) 0.2198 (0.4145) 0.1378 (0.3449)
Number of households 1205 537 668
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.A.3.2: Summary statistics of children characteristics
All households Donors Non-Donors
Net transfer given 596.1 (3156.3) 1690.34 (5139.6) —
Percentage of donors 0.3527 (0.4779) — —
Male 0.455 (0.4981) 0.5043 (0.5003) 0.4282 (0.495)
Age 38.32 (9.92) 39.24 (9.63) 37.82 (10.04)
Illiterate 0.1517 (0.3588) 0.0949 (0.2932) 0.1827 (0.3865)
Less than elementary school 0.0881 (0.2835) 0.0752 (0.2638) 0.0952 (0.2935)
Elementary school 0.2335 (0.4231) 0.2573 (0.4374) 0.2205 (0.4147)
Middle school 0.2967 (0.4569) 0.3099 (0.4627) 0.2896 (0.4537)
High school or above 0.2302 (0.421) 0.263 (0.4405) 0.2123 (0.4091)
Living in urban area 0.3176 (0.4657) 0.339 (0.4736) 0.3059 (0.4609)
Is working 0.8199 (0.3844) 0.8301 (0.3758) 0.8144 (0.389)
Num. of children the child has 1.48 (1.03) 1.4 (0.94) 1.53 (1.07)
Live in a diff. province 0.1411 (0.3482) 0.1437 (0.351) 0.1397 (0.3468)
Parents provided childcare 0.0851 (0.2791) 0.1015 (0.3021) 0.0763 (0.2655)
Number of observations 3020 1065 1955
a Source: Author’s calculation from CHARLS
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Social Fathers on the Well-Being of
Out-of-Wedlock Children
2.1 Introduction
Social fathers, stepfathers or unrelated cohabiting romantic partners of biological
mothers, become more widespread as a result of the increasing out-of-wedlock child-
bearing. How the presence of social fathers affects the unrelated children, especially
the young children, is not thoroughly studied. The main objective of this study is to
examine whether the presence of social fathers has any negative effect on the well-
being of young out-of-wedlock children. The presence of social fathers is defined as
either the mother marrying to a new partner or the mother cohabiting with a new
partner. In order to identify the effect of social father on the children, I compare
out-of-wedlock children in family with biological mother and social father to out-of-
wedlock children in family only with biological mother.
The proportion of children born to unmarried parents has increased considerably
in the past forty years. In 1970, only 12 percent of newborns occurred outside marriage
(Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002). In 2010, the figure increased to about 40
percent (Hamilton, Martin and Ventura, 2011)1. Delays and declines in marriages
1The rate of non-marital births seemed to have stabilized from 2007 to 2010 at around 40 percent.
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raise the number of women who may be more likely to have non-marital births. The
decrease in shotgun marriage2 has also been associated with the increase in non-
marital births (Carlson, McLanahan and England, 2004). Non-marital births are
usually associated with socioeconomic disadvantages and family instability. This
raises the interest of researchers to study non-marital births and other related issues.
The increasing out-of-wedlock childbearing contributes to the prevalence of social
fathers. Estimation in the 90s showed that a quarter of children would live with a
stepparent at some point during childhood (Bumpass, Raley and Sweet, 1995)3. The
reason behind that trend is that children born to unmarried parents have a higher
chance to experience the union dissolution of the biological parents. The parents are
more likely to form romantic relationship with new partners. Many single mothers
choose to cohabit with new partner or remarry (Osborne and McLanahan, 2007).
Children would have to live with mother’s new partners following their mothers’
decision.
The presence of social fathers has been shown to have some degree of negative
effect on children. Children living in families with biological mothers and stepfathers
do not fare better than those living with single mothers (Coleman, Ganong and Fine,
2000). Children and adolescents living with a social father and the biological mother
are more likely to demonstrate inferior outcome compared to those living with two
biological parents (Brown, 2004; Coleman, Ganong and Fine, 2000; Hofferth, 2006;
Manning and Lamb, 2003; Thomson, Hanson and McLanahan, 1994), though these
results may due to the benefit of having both biological parents in the family rather
than the negative effect of social fathers.
The effect of social father on the well-being of younger children has not been
thoroughly studied. The aforementioned research focused more on how social fathers
2Shotgun marriage means the marriage due to an unplanned pregnancy.
3The percentage is very likely to be higher because of larger number of non-marital birth at
present.
53
affect older children and adolescents. Most of the children and adolescents may have
gone through divorce and remarriage of the biological parents. For children born to
unmarried parents, the presence of social fathers may occur very early in the children’s
life. It is also less common for those children to experience the divorce of biological
parents. According to Bzostek (2008), younger children may show less resistance
towards social fathers because they may not be mature enough to understand the
difference between biological fathers and social fathers. In contrast, older children
and adolescents are mature enough to know the difference. They may show larger
resistance towards the existence of social fathers. Because of the different degree of
resistance, younger children and older children could show quite different response
to the existence of social fathers. It would be interesting to examine whether social
fathers have any beneficial or detrimental effect on the well-being of young children.
This study examines whether the presence of social fathers has any negative effect
on young out-of-wedlock children’s well-being. I used data from the Fragile Families
and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS), a representative sample of non-marital births
in 20 U.S. cities. The FFCWS provides detailed information on marriage, fertility,
socioeconomic status of the biological mothers of the children. I focus on the effect of
social father on the cognitive ability of the out-of-wedlock children. Cognitive ability is
measured at age 3 using the score from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test(PPVT)
(Dunn and Dunn, 1997). The PPVT is widely used to measure verbal ability and
receptive hearing in children and adults. It is a very good assessment of children’s
language development. Researchers also found significant correlation between PPVT
score and scores from other achievement test and intelligence test4. Apart from the
PPVT score, the effect of social father on children’s heath and behavioral outcomes
is also examined.
This study also addresses the selection issue. Children are not randomly assigned
4See Childers and Durham (1994); Smith, Smith and Dobbs (1991) for details.
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to have social fathers. It is more likely to be the case of a self-selection of the moth-
ers. The presence of social fathers may be correlated with the characteristics of the
mothers, such as education level, employment status, and income level. The outcome
difference between children with social fathers and children without social fathers
may be caused by those characteristics of the mothers regardless of the presence of
social fathers. Simple comparison of the well-being of these two groups of children
may lead to biased results. To address the selection issue, I use the propensity score
matching method5 to estimate the effect of social fathers on children’s well-being.
The method estimates the average treatment effect by constructing a setting similar
to an experiment in which the treatment (the presence of social fathers in this study)
is randomly assigned.
This paper extends previous research on the effect of social fathers to younger
children born to unmarried parents. Using the propensity score matching method, I
found that the presence of social fathers have a negative effect on children’s cognitive
ability. Children aged three living in families with social fathers score around three
points lower on the PPVT than those living only with their biological mothers. This
result may only reflect part of the problem faced by children with social fathers. Be-
cause of the widespread of non-martial births, social fathers would still be a common
phenomenon in the future. Any negative effect caused by the social fathers will affect
a large portion of child population6.
5See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998); Imbens (2004) for
details of the propensity score matching method.
6Around 4.2 million children under age 18 in the United States were living with biological mother
and a social father, as showed by data from the 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation
(Sweeney, 2010).
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2.2 Literature
2.2.1 Literature on the Well-Being of Out-of-Wedlock Chil-
dren
The availability of the FFCWS boosted a new wave of research on non-marital births.
In the past, the lack of data similar to the FFCWS has limited the research on the
well-being of children born to unmarried parents. The FFCWS contains detailed
information on the developmental and health outcomes of the children. Research
on the well-being of out-of-wedlock children using the FFCWS mainly focused on
three broad areas: Child’s Cognitive Development, Child’s Behavior Problems and
Child’s Health. Those research mainly focused on examining how factors, such as
family structure and family stability, affect the well-being of out-of-wedlock children.
Nonetheless, the effect of social fathers on the well-being of out-of-wedlock children
is not well-studied.
Craigie (2008) examined the effect of family structure and family stability on
child cognitive development. The PPVT score at age three of the child is the variable
of interest. For family structure, she distinguished between two-parent families and
single-mother families. For family stability, she distinguished between stable families
and unstable families. She found that family structure does not have any negative
effect on the PPVT score as there was no significant difference in the score between
children in stable two-parent families and stable single-mother families. Yet, she
found that family instability had an adverse effect on the PPVT score as children in
unstable families scored significantly lower in PPVT than children in stable single-
mother families.
Cooper, Osborne, Beck and McLanahan (2011) studied how mother’s partnership
instability affects the cognitive development of the child. The PPVT score at age
five of the child is used to evaluate the child’s cognitive development. Partnership
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instability was found to have detrimental effect on child’s cognitive development as
there was a negative relationship between child’s PPVT score and the number of
partnership transitions experienced by the mother after the child’s birth.
Liu and Heiland (2012) investigated how the marriage of biological parents affects
the cognitive performance of out-of-wedlock children. They used the propensity score
matching method to address for the selection issue and identify the casual effect of
marriage. They compared two groups of children with similar characteristics and
parental characteristics. The only difference between the two groups is whether the
parents marry or not after the child was born. They found that the marriage of the
biological parents significantly increased the child’s cognitive performance in terms of
the PPVT score at age three.
Ryan, Kalil and Leininger (2009) studied the relationship between material sup-
port for the mothers and children’s behavioral problems. They focused on mothers
who were unmarried at child’s birth and were living at 200 percent of poverty line
or below. They defined material support using some measures on availability of
loans from relatives and friends, availability of bank loans, emergency child care and
emergency accommodation provided by relatives and friends. Children’s behavioral
problems are measured by the Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach, 1991, 1992). In-
ternalizing behaviors like depressed and anxiety as well as externalizing behaviors like
aggressive behavior are both measured. They found that mothers with more material
support have a positive effect on reducing children’s behavioral problems.
Osborne and McLanahan (2007) examined how mother’s partnership changes af-
fect children’s behavior. Similar to the study by Ryan et al. (2009), the Child Behav-
ior Checklist (Achenbach, 1992) is used to evaluate the child’s behavioral problems.
They found that the number of mother’s partnership transition increased the mother’s
stress level and lowered the quality of mothering. These two forces led to children’s
elevated behavioral problems.
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Cooper et al. (2011) also studied how mother’s partnership instability affects chil-
dren’s behavior. Again, they used the Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach, 1991) at
age five to evaluate child’s behavioral problems. They found a positive relationship
between the number of partnership transitions and children’s behavioral problems.
This means that partnership instability has a harmful effect on children’s behavior.
Bzostek and Beck (2011) examined how family structure and family instability
affect children’s health outcome. They used several measures of children’s health
outcome such as whether the child is overweight and whether the child has asthma.
They found that children living with single mothers fared worse than children born to
married parents, with the former group having higher chances of obesity and having
asthma. However, they failed to find consistent results to support that family stability
had any harmful effect on children’s health.
Harknett (2009) focused on the effect of family structure on children’s risk of
having asthma. She found that children living with single mothers have the highest
chance of asthma, comparing to those living with married parents and those living
with mothers and cohabiting partners.
Guterman et al. (2009) investigated the risk of maternal physical child abuse
using FFCWS. They found that the marriage between biological parents did not have
any positive effect on reducing the probability of maternal child abuse. Instead, some
other factors such as father’s education and father’s positive involvement in parenting
have a beneficial effect on reducing the chance of mother penalizing the child.
2.2.2 Social Fathers and Child Well-Being
Before the FFCWS, research on stepparents mostly focused on children who experi-
enced the divorce of biological parents and the remarriage of the parents who lived
with them. The research on the effect of stepparent on child well-being was boosted
by the availability of better datasets and improved methodology after 1990s (Cole-
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man, Ganong and Fine, 2000)7. Manning and Lamb (2003) examined the well-being
of adolescents in families with cohabiting stepparent. They found that children living
in families with cohabiting stepparent fare worse than children living in families with
both biological parents. On the other hand, they had similar outcomes compared
to children living with single unmarried mothers. Brown (2004) investigated how
family structure affects child well-being. No significant difference was found between
adolescents in stepfamilies and adolescents with single mothers. Yuan and Hamilton
(2006) examined the effect of stepfathers on the health of adolescents. They found
that stepfathers in general have a positive effect on adolescents’ health. This positive
relationship was further boosted if the stepfathers have a non-conflicting relationship
with the children or the relationship has existed for a long period of time. Hofferth
(2006) also studied the effect of the family structure on behavior problems of children
aged 3 to 12. They found similar result as stepchildren fare less well than children in
families with married biological parents.
With the FFCWS, the effect of divorce can be separated from the effect of step-
parents’ presence. Researchers can focus only on the effect of stepparents on out-of-
wedlock children. For example, Bzostek (2008) tested whether the cohabiting social
fathers have the same positive effect on children’s well-being as cohabiting biological
fathers. Children’s well-being is evaluated by behavioral outcomes and an overall
measure of health. The involvement of fathers was measured by the number of days
in a week that the fathers involved in some activities with the children. Bzostek found
that the social fathers are as beneficial for children’s well-being as biological fathers.
Berger, Paxson and Waldfogel (2009) examined whether children faced higher risk of
maltreatment in families with social fathers. The risk of maltreatment is evaluated by
whether the families have been contacted by Child Protective Services (CPS). They
found that the presence of social fathers increased the probability of being contacted
7Detailed review of related research in that decade after 1990 can refer to Coleman et al. (2000).
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by CPS, compared to families with a cohabiting or married biological father.
2.3 Empirical Approach
2.3.1 Data
The data set used in this study is the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
(FFCWS). The FFCWS follows a cohort of 4,898 children born between 1998 and
2000 in 20 U.S. cities8. Around 3,700 of them were born to unmarried parents as
the study over-sampled out-of-wedlock children. A baseline interview was conducted
at the time of childbirth. Both biological parents were interviewed at baseline inter-
view9. They were re-interviewed when the child was 1 and 3 years old. Information
about the characteristics of the parents, relationship between the parents, parent-child
relationship, socioeconomic activities, and child development were collected.
A supplementary survey, called the “36-Month In-Home Longitudinal Study of
Pre-School Aged Children”, was used to assess the children at age 3. This sup-
plementary survey collected information from a random subsample10 of the baseline
respondents. Details such as child’s behavior and living environment were recorded
by the interviewers. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test(PPVT) (Dunn and Dunn,
1997) is administered by the interviewers at the children’s residence as part of the
supplementary survey.
This study involves two groups of children. One group is out-of-wedlock children
in family with biological mother and social father and the other group is out-of-
wedlock children in family only with biological mother. The sample used in this
study is selected with the following exclusions. PPVT scores are only available for
8See Reichman, Teitler, Garfinkel and McLanahan (2001) for detailed description of the sample
and design of the FFCWS.
9Not all biological fathers are available for interviews.
102,368 children and their mothers participated in the supplementary survey.
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those who participated in the supplementary survey. Those who are not in that
random subsample are excluded (2,530 cases). Twin births are excluded from the
sample since we want to focus on single child (51 cases). Children who did not live
with the mothers most of the time are excluded since that may induce a negative
effect on child’s well-being (49 cases). This study focused on the well-being of out-
of-wedlock children. Children were dropped if their biological parents were married
at baseline (495 cases). In order to limit the influence of the biological father on the
children, children whose biological parents were married at year 1 were dropped (127
cases). Biological fathers who were married to the mothers or living with the children
at year 3 were also dropped (542 cases). Some more cases (242 cases) were excluded
because of missing information on the dependent or independent variables. With
all the exclusions, a sample of 862 children remained. Using the propensity score
matching method, treatment is defined as the child living with biological mother and
social father. I estimate the propensity score for which observations in the sample
are selected into treatment. Observations with a propensity score falling outside the
region of common support were dropped (29 cases). A final sample of 833 children
was analyzed.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The standardized PPVT score11 of the child is the main variable of interest to measure
the well-being of the child. The sample has a mean score of 83.9. Children with the
presence of social fathers apparently have a lower score than those without social
fathers (82 vs. 84.4)12.
The presence of social fathers enters the analysis as the main determining variable.
If the mother was married to a new partner or the mother was cohabiting with a new
11Standardized PPVT score is used because it is adjusted for the mental age of the child.
12The difference in PPVT score has some predictive power in future’s outcome. For example, Liu
and Heiland (2012) found that a four-point positive difference in the PPVT score at age 3 may raise
the odds of high school graduation by 2 percentage point.
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partner, we count these as the presence of social fathers. Among the sample of 833
children, 19.5 percent of them (163 children) were living under the presence of social
fathers. The remaining 670 children are all living with the mothers without the
presence of social fathers in the household.
Variables on child characteristics are included in the analysis to control their
effects on both the well-being of children and the presence of social fathers. The
child’s gender is included as it was found to have an effect on the involvement of
biological fathers13. This may then affect the presence of social fathers. Medical and
psychological research found consistent and rich evidence on the negative effect of
low birth weight on cognitive performance14. Thus, whether the child is a low-birth-
weight baby15 is included in the analysis. Also, whether the child is his/her mother’s
first birth is also included as having other children before the focal child may increase
the need of having a father figure in the household.
Characteristics of mother are expected to influence both the well-being of the child
and the decision of having a social father. Demographics like age, race, education
level, income, labor market participation, poverty level and religion are all included.
Behaviors of the mothers may also have effect on the child’s well-being. The number
of days per week that mother reads story to the child, Mother’s PPVT score and
whether the mother meets depression criteria are included in the analysis. Prenatal
smoking and prenatal alcoholic consumption are included as they may have negative
effects on child’s cognitive abilities .
Factors affecting the presence of social fathers have to be included. One of those
factors is how close is the relationship between the biological father and the family,
including the biological mother and the child. Variables such as whether the biological
parents are in romantic relationship at childbirth, whether the child uses biological
13Read Lundberg, McLanahan and Rose (2007) for more details.
14For example, read Hack, Klein and Taylor (1995) for more details.
15Low-birth-weight baby is defined as baby weighing less than 5 lbs 8 ounces at birth.
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father’s last name, whether biological father’s name is on the birth certificate and
whether paternity is officially established are all included in the analysis.
Descriptive statistics for all the aforementioned variables are reported in Table 1.
Summary statistics are reported for the whole sample in the first column. Summary
statistics are also reported separately for children with social fathers and children
without social fathers in second column and third column respectively.
2.3.3 Methodology
To study the relationship between the presence of social fathers and the well-being
of the child, the following model is defined:
Yi = b0 + b1Fi + b2Xi + i (2.3.3.1)
Fi = I(c0 + c1Xi + µi > 0) (2.3.3.2)
where household is indexed by i. The variable indicating the well-being of the child
is denoted by Yi. The variable Fi denotes the presence of social fathers. A value of
one for Fi indicates a social father is living in the household. He can be a cohabiting
partner of the mother or he has married the mother. A value of zero for Fi means
a social father does not exist in the household. The vector Xi includes all other
determining variables such as household characteristics. Both i and µi are normally
distributed error terms with mean zero. The coefficient b1 captures the relationship
between the presence of social fathers and the well-being of the child.
Selection issue happens because the presence of social father is not randomly
assigned to the children. It is very likely that mothers who choose to be single are
different from mothers who choose to cohabit with or marry to new partners. Some
factors cause the mothers to remain single or accept a new partner. At the same
time, these factors may also affect the well-being of the child. This will create the
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correlation between i and µi. In the presence of correlation between i and µi, using
ordinary least squares to estimate the coefficient b1 may result in biased estimation.
Ordinary least squares cannot identify the pure effect of social fathers on the well-
being of child. Other factors affecting the presence of social fathers in the first place
also have their effects on the well-being of child. The ordinary least squares estimate
will be a combination of the effect of social fathers and the effect of those factors.
I use the propensity score matching method to identify the pure effect of having
a social father on child’s well-being. Under the context of propensity score matching
method, having a social father is viewed as having a treatment. In an ordinary
randomized experiment, outcomes between the treatment group and the control group
can be compared directly. In a nonrandomized experiment, the treatment group and
the control group differ systematically because the treatment is the process of self-
selection rather than a random assignment. A direct comparison of the average
outcomes between the two groups cannot reveal the casual effect of the treatment on
the outcome. Rather, the propensity score matching method uses the propensity score
to match observations from the control group with observations from the treatment
group. Observations are matched between the two groups in order to make the
distribution of variables from the treatment group as similar as the distribution of
variables from the control group. Matching is done by finding the match from the
opposite group with similar propensity score. With the matching, the counterfactual
outcome, in the form of the treated without treatment, is built. The counterfactual
outcome is then used to compare with the outcome of the treatment group to identify
the pure of treatment.
In my model, treatment is the presence of social fathers, denoted by Fi. The
household with social fathers (Fi = 1) is the treatment group while the household
without social fathers (Fi = 0) is the control group. The potential outcome of the
child in household i if the child is under treatment is denoted by Yi(1). If the same
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child is not under treatment, the potential outcome is denoted by Yi(0). Only one
of the potential outcomes, Yi(1) or Yi(0) can be observed for each child. Ordinary
least squares estimates give us the simple average outcome difference between the
treatment group and the control group: b1OLS = E[Yi(1)|Fi = 1] − E[Yi(0)|Fi = 0],
which is the average treatment effect (ATE). As the treatment status is the result of
self-selection rather than a random assignment, average treatment effect (ATE) is not
able to assign the pure effect of treatment. Instead, we need to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET):
b1ATET = E[Yi(1)|Fi = 1]− E[Yi(0)|Fi = 1] (2.3.3.3)
for which is the difference between expected outcome of the child with the treatment
and the expected outcome of the same child if the child receives no treatment.
In order to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, we need both
terms in equation (2.3.3.3). The first term can be observed directly from the data.
The second term cannot be observed directly from the data. Instead, the outcome of
the control group is used to estimate expected outcome of the child in the treatment
group if the child receives no treatment. Using the propensity score matching method,
a match from the control group is found for every observation in the treatment group.
In order to estimate the average treatment effect, one needs the assumption that
the treatment satisfies some form of exogeneity (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Dif-
ferent versions of the assumption are referred to as unconfoundedness (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983), selection on observables (Heckman and Robb, 1985) or conditional
independence assumption (CIA) (Lechner, 1999). Unconfoundedness can be written
as
Y (0), Y (1)
∐
F |X (2.3.3.4)
where
∐
denotes independence. It means that conditional on a set of observable
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covariates X, all potential outcomes (Y (0), Y (1)) are independent of the treatment
status. Heckman et al. (1998) showed that the assumption of unconfoundedness is
overly strong. Lechner (1999) proposed the conditional independence assumption
(CIA), which is a weaker assumption than unconfoundedness. Conditional indepen-
dence assumption (CIA) can be written as
Y (0)
∐
F |X (2.3.3.5)
Conditional independence assumption (CIA) means that conditional on a set of ob-
servable covariates X, the potential outcomes in the absence of treatment Y (0) are
independent of the treatment status. In other words, the outcome of the control group
is what the outcome of the treatment group would have been if the treatment group
did not receive the treatment. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) stated that for estimat-
ing the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), we only need conditional
independence assumption instead of unconfoundedness16.
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) mentioned that there is a dimensionality problem
for the matching procedure. Increasing the number of observable covariates will in-
crease the number of possible matches exponentially. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
showed that if unconfoundedness holds for a set of observable covariates X, uncon-
foundedness will also hold for some functions of X. Propensity score, the probability
of selection into treatment, is one of the possible functions of X. Propensity score
can thus reduce the dimensionality of matching procedure from a high dimension to
a scalar in the form of probability. allowing the use of the propensity score matching
method.
The conditional independence assumption (CIA) indicates that the covariates af-
fecting the potential outcome and treatment status simultaneously must be observ-
16Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) used the name unconfoundedness for controls to indicate condi-
tional independence assumption (CIA).
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able. The conditional independence assumption (CIA) is non-testable. The richness
of the data enables us to reduce selection bias generated by the unobservables and
justify the use of propensity score matching method. The FFCWS contains detailed
information of the out-of-wedlock children including characteristics of the biological
parents, relationship between the parents, parent-child relationship, socioeconomic
activities, and child development. Many important determinants of presence of social
fathers are accounted for by the richness of the FFCWS. This provides some justifica-
tions of using the propensity score matching method. Apart from that, other studies
rely on sensitivity analysis to assess whether the point estimates of the treatment
effect are robust. The sensitivity analysis also provides some justifications on the
assumption17.
With the propensity score, the matching algorithm used in my analysis is the
kernel matching. Kernel matching is a nonparametric matching estimator that uses
a weighted average of almost all observations in the control group to create the coun-
terfactual outcomes for the observations in the treatment group. The weights depend
on the choice of the kernel. Smith and Todd (2005) stated that the weights depend on
the propensity score distance between the observations in the control group and the
targeted observation in the treatment group for which the counterfactual outcome is
estimated. A symmetric, nonnegative, unimodal kernel gives higher weight to individ-
uals with propensity scores closer to that of the targeted observation in the treatment
group. At the same time, it gives lower weight to individuals with propensity scores
further away to that of the targeted observation in the treatment group.
For the propensity score matching method, several choices of kernel are used in this
paper, including Gaussian kernel, Epanechnikov kernel and uniform kernel. Different
kernels are used because this can show the robustness of the results. Apart from the
choice of kernel, results may also be sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. According
17The details of sensitivity analysis in this study is in next section.
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to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), a trade-off would arise depending on the choice of
bandwidth. A high bandwidth gives an estimate with higher bias but lower variance
while a low bandwidth gives an estimate with lower bias but higher variance. Two
bandwidths were used for each kernel respectively. On the other hand, the matching
method with replacement is used because of the small sample size. Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2008) stated that matching with replacement lead to estimate with lower
bias and higher variance.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Effects of social father on child’s PPVT score
The first step of the analysis is to estimate the propensity scores for having a social
father in the households for the sample. A probit model is used to estimate the
propensity score, defined as the probability of having a social father in the household.
All the aforementioned variables are included in the probit estimation.
A condition of common support is needed for using the propensity score matching
method. This can guarantee the observations in the treatment group and those in the
control group are comparable with sufficient overlap in their propensity scores. Ob-
servations having propensity scores outside the common support region are excluded
from the analysis. The common support region has a lower bound and upper bound.
The upper bound is defined as the highest propensity score obtained by the obser-
vations in the control group. The lower bound is defined as the lowest propensity
score obtained by the observations in the treatment group18. Using this method, the
common support region is [0.0299251, 0.6773368]. A total of 833 observations have
propensity scores falling within this region.
18This method of defining a common support region of propensity score is also used in a study
by Liu and Heiland (2012).
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Table 2 summarized the results from the probit estimation. The probit estimates
showed that several factors have significant effects on the presence of social fathers.
For example, social father is less likely to be present if the child is his/her mother’s
first birth. The reason is because having other children before the focal child may
increase the financial need of having a new partner in the household. Also, the
child is less likely to have a social father if the biological parents were in a romantic
relationship at childbirth. This is consistent with usual behavior as people need time
to accept a new partner after just ending a romantic relationship.
The second step of the analysis is to find the estimated effect of having a social
father in the household on the well-being of the child. The standardized PPVT score
of the child is used as a measure of the child’s cognitive development. Table 3 sum-
marized the results on the estimated effect of social fathers on child’s PPVT score.
Column 1 of the table shows the ordinary least squares estimate for comparison pur-
pose19. Column 2 to 7 shows the propensity score matching estimates using Gaussian
kernel, Epanechnikov kernel and uniform kernel, each with two different bandwidths.
Using the propensity score matching method, I found that the PPVT scores of
children in the household with social fathers are on average significantly lower than
those of children in the household without social fathers by 2.7 to 3.7 points20. The
OLS estimates also showed similar results, though the magnitude of the estimate is
generally smaller than that of the propensity score matching estimates21.
Several factors can explain the negative effect of social fathers on child’s PPVT
scores. PPVT score is a measure of cognitive abilities. Decreasing maternal time with
the child has been found to have harmful effect on child’s cognitive abilities (Ruhm,
19The detailed ordinary least squares estimate of all other variables on child’s PPVT score are
presented in Appendix A.1.
20Liu and Heiland (2012) found that the marriage of biological parents after childbirth increased
the PPVT score of the child by 3.5 to 4.4 points compared to the case if the biological parents had
remained unmarried.
21The results became insignificant when the definition of social fathers changed by including those
who are romantic partners of biological mothers but not living with them. Details on those results
are available upon request.
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2004). Maternal time with the child is controlled in the analysis by the number of
days per week that the mother reads story to child. However, the presence of social
father might affect the quality of maternal time with the child. Mothers with new
partners may shift some of the focus on the romantic relationship instead of focusing
on the only child. Thus, the quality of mother-child time may be worse than before.
This can explain the drop in PPVT score for child with social father.
Another possible explanation is the parent’s incentive to allocate resources toward
the child. Hofferth and Anderson (2003) found that stepparents tend to be less
involved with the child compared to biological parents. For single mothers, they
focus on their own child and put all the resources on the child. For mothers with
new partners, they may plan or already have new child with the new partners. The
resources putting on the original child would decrease because of new competition.
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I checked the robustness of the results using a sensitivity analysis.
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the change in the results under which
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) did not hold. The analysis is not
a test but it can provide some justifications of using the propensity score matching
method. I followed the work of Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008), who proposed
a method to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates of propensity score matching
method. They created different possible situations in which CIA did not hold. They
further derived the point estimates under those situations. If the estimates didn’t
change by much under different situations, the estimates are robust and it justifies
the use of propensity score matching method.
The proposed method by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) first assumed that
the unobservables in the model can be summarized by a binary variable. They fur-
ther assumed that the unobserved binary covariate U is related to both the treatment
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and the outcome for which is a deviation from CIA. The distribution of U is then
characterized by specifying some parameters. With the parameters, a predicted value
of U is given for each observation, including those in the treatment group and those
in the control group. Lastly, the treatment effect is re-estimated using the propensity
score matching method by including the binary covariate U in the set of the indepen-
dent variables. This method allows us to check the robustness of the estimate under
different assumption of U .
In the sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that conditional independence assumption
(CIA) does not hold. Yet, the CIA holds given the observables X and the binary
covariate U :
Y (0)
∐
F |X, U. (2.4.2.1)
In order to characterize the distribution of U , the parameters need to be specified are
the probability that U = 1 in each of the four groups defined by the outcome value
and treatment status. The parameters are the following:
Pr(U = 1|F = i, Y ∗ = j,X) = Pr(U = 1|F = i, Y ∗ = j) ≡ pij (2.4.2.2)
with i, j ∈ 0, 1. When the outcome is a continuous variable, a binary transformation
of the outcome is needed in which Y ∗ = 1 if the outcome is above the mean. By
choosing the four parameters pij, one can specify the binary covariate U to have a
negative effect on the outcome of the control group (p01−p00 < 1)22 and have a positive
effect on the selection into the treatment group (p1. − p0. > 0). This specification of
U might influence the estimates of average treatment effect on the treated (ATET)
23. According to Ichino et al. (2008), the sensitivity analysis included the estimation
22I focused on the negative effect on the outcome of the control group because the results showed
that the presence of social fathers have a negative effect on the PPVT score.
23I followed the work of Ichino et al. (2008) and defined the following: d = p01−p00 is the measure
of the effect of U on the outcome of the control group; s = p1. − p0. is the measure of the effect of
U on the selection into the treatment group.
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of the odds ratio of U in the logit model of Pr(Y ∗ = 1|F = 0, U,X), defined as Γ, to
indicate the “outcome effect” of U . Similarly, the odds ratio of U in the logit model
of Pr(F = 1|U,X) is estimated, defined as Λ, to indicate the “treatment effect.”
After specifying the binary covariate U , the effect of social father on PPVT score
is re-estimated using the propensity score matching method with U as an additional
independent variable. Table 4 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis. For com-
parison purpose, the baseline estimate without the covariate U is -2.962. For small
treatment effect (s = 0.1), the estimate is still significant for very large outcome effect
(d = −0.5). Similarly, for small outcome effect (d = −0.1), the magnitude of the esti-
mates only becomes insignificant for very large treatment effect (s = 0.5). Both cases
seem not very plausible according to Ichino et al. (2008). Also, the estimate is still
significant for a combination of moderate treatment effect (s = 0.2) and moderate
outcome effect (d = −0.2). Thus, the sensitivity analysis showed that the estimates
using the propensity score matching method are quite robust under some reasonable
deviations of the CIA.
2.4.3 Effects of social father on child’s health and behavioral
outcomes
I found that the presence of social fathers did not have any significant effect on
child’s health and behavioral outcomes. Whether the child has asthma is used to
indicate the child’s health problem24. Child is classified as having asthma if the
mother was informed by a doctor or health professional that the child has asthma.
Child’s behavioral outcomes are evaluated by several measures. Items from the Age
2-3 Child Behavior Checklist(CBCL) by Achenbach (1992) were asked in the FFCWS.
Mothers responded to each item with the following: 0 = not true of my child; 1 =
24Asthma was often used as a measure of child’s health outcome (Bzostek and Beck, 2011;
Harknett, 2009). Asthma is chosen as a measure of child’s health outcome in this paper for the
purpose of comparing to past literature.
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sometimes / somewhat true; 2 = very/often true. The scores from the items were
summed up to calculate Anxious/Depressed and Withdrawn (internalizing behavior)
as well as Aggressive and Destructive (externalizing behavior) subscales. A measure to
assess child’s positive behavior was also included in the survey. Items from the Express
subscale of the Adaptive Social Behavior Inventory(ASBI) by Hogan, Scott and Bauer
(1992) were asked in the FFCWS. The ASBI subscale can measure children’s social
competence and prosocial skills with peers and adults. The Cronbach’s alphas25
were calculated for each measure and the numbers showed that the items used in
each measure are reliable in the sample26. Table 5 presents the summary statistics
of health and behavioral outcomes. Summary statistics are reported for the whole
sample in the first column. Summary statistics are also reported separately for the
sample with social fathers and for the sample without social fathers in second column
and third column respectively.
Similar to the analysis on child’s PPVT score, the propensity score matching
method is used to estimate the effect of social fathers on child’s health and behav-
ioral outcomes. Table 6 presents the results of the analysis. I found that the presence
of social fathers do not have any significant effect on child’s health and behavioral
outcomes. The result is unsurprising considering even the presence of biological fa-
thers do not have significant effect on child’s health and behavioral outcomes. Liu
and Heiland (2012) found that the marriage of biological parents after childbirth did
not have any significant effect on child’s health and behavioral outcomes at age three.
As I have mentioned previously, it is not unusual that the relationship between social
father and the child is not as close as the one between biological parent and the child
(Hofferth and Anderson, 2003). Thus, the addition of a social father to the household
of a single mother may not be beneficial to the child in terms of health and behavioral
outcomes.
25The Cronbach’s alpha examines the internal consistency of a psychometric test score of a sample.
26The detailed list of items for each measure is presented in Appendix A.2.
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2.5 Conclusion
The study aims to show how the presence of social fathers affects the well-being of
out-of-wedlock children. Previous studies focused more on the effect of stepparents
on older children or adolescents. This study extends on examining the effect of social
fathers to children born to unmarried parents by using a large representative sample of
out-of-wedlock children. For these children, the occurrence of social fathers happens
early in their life without going through the divorce or separate of the biological
parents. This can identify the pure effect of social father’s presence independent of
the change of family structure or the effect of divorce.
The presence of social fathers is the result of self-selection. To address the selection
issue, I used the propensity score matching method for the analysis. I found that the
presence of social father has a significant negative effect on child’s cognitive abilities,
measured by the child’s PPVT score. At the same time, the presence of social father
has no significant effect on child’s health and behavioral outcomes.
The result found in this study may only reflect part of the problem faced by
children with social fathers. Because of the widespread of non-marital births, the
occurrence of young children living with social fathers would become more common
in the future. Any negative effect caused by the social fathers will affect a large portion
of the children population. Future research using a wider range of child’s outcomes
would provide a clearer picture on the effects of social fathers on the well-being of
children.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the sample
Sample Mean With Social Father Without Social Father
PPVT score of the child 83.91 (15.44) 82.01 (16.63) 84.38 (15.12)
Presence of social father 0.1957 (0.397) — —
Child is of low birth weight 0.1092 (0.3121) 0.0982 (0.2984) 0.1119 (0.3155)
Child is a boy 0.533 (0.4992) 0.5521 (0.4988) 0.5284 (0.4996)
Child is mother’s first birth 0.4034 (0.4909) 0.3865 (0.4884) 0.4075 (0.4917)
Mother’s age 23 (5.03) 21.93 (4.38) 23.26 (5.15)
Mother’s age squared 554.2 (264.82) 500.13 (221.19) 567.36 (272.91)
Mother is white 0.1056 (0.3076) 0.1411 (0.3492) 0.097 (0.2962)
Mother is Hispanic 0.1657 (0.372) 0.1411 (0.3492) 0.1716 (0.3774)
Mother is black 0.7095 (0.4543) 0.6871 (0.4651) 0.7149 (0.4518)
Mother is of other race 0.0192 (0.1373) 0.0307 (0.173) 0.0164 (0.1272)
Mother’s education: less than HS 0.4406 (0.4968) 0.4847 (0.5013) 0.4299 (0.4954)
Mother’s education: HS 0.3169 (0.4656) 0.3252 (0.4699) 0.3149 (0.4648)
Mother’s education: some college 0.2185 (0.4135) 0.1534 (0.3615) 0.2343 (0.4239)
Mother’s education: college 0.024 (0.1532) 0.0368 (0.1889) 0.0209 (0.1431)
PPVT score of the mother 87.16 (11.19) 87.5 (10.85) 87.07 (11.27)
Mother is working 0.5522 (0.4976) 0.5215 (0.5011) 0.5597 (0.4968)
Prenatal smoking by mother 0.2485 (0.4324) 0.2883 (0.4544) 0.2388 (0.4267)
Prenatal drinking by mother 0.1044 (0.306) 0.1043 (0.3066) 0.1045 (0.3061)
Mother is foreign born 0.036 (0.1864) 0.0368 (0.1889) 0.0358 (0.186)
Mother is Catholic 0.1753 (0.3804) 0.1595 (0.3673) 0.1791 (0.3837)
Mother is Protestant 0.4358 (0.4962) 0.4049 (0.4924) 0.4433 (0.4971)
Mother is of other religion 0.1801 (0.3845) 0.2025 (0.4031) 0.1746 (0.3799)
Mother has no religion 0.2089 (0.4068) 0.2331 (0.4241) 0.203 (0.4025)
Mother attends religious activity 0.5558 (0.4972) 0.5583 (0.4981) 0.5552 (0.4973)
Household income (<= $10, 000) 0.3914 (0.4883) 0.362 (0.482) 0.3985 (0.49)
HH’s inc. ($10, 000− $25, 000) 0.3601 (0.4803) 0.3374 (0.4743) 0.3657 (0.482)
HH’s inc. (> $25, 000) 0.2485 (0.4324) 0.3006 (0.4599) 0.2358 (0.4248)
HH’s Poverty ratio (0− 49%) 0.3565 (0.4793) 0.362 (0.482) 0.3552 (0.4789)
HH’s Poverty ratio (50− 99%) 0.2437 (0.4296) 0.2209 (0.4161) 0.2493 (0.4329)
HH’s Poverty ratio (100− 199%) 0.2425 (0.4289) 0.2393 (0.4279) 0.2433 (0.4294)
HH’s Poverty ratio (>= 200%) 0.1573 (0.3643) 0.1779 (0.3836) 0.1522 (0.3595)
Days in a week mother reads story 5.2005 (2.1263) 5.3129 (2.1301) 5.1731 (2.126)
No. of adults in household 1.7899 (0.9696) 2.0859 (0.6885) 1.7179 (1.0139)
No. of kids in household 2.4202 (1.4087) 2.4049 (1.3592) 2.4239 (1.4214)
Mother meets depression criteria 0.2533 (0.4352) 0.2209 (0.4161) 0.2612 (0.4396)
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth 0.7587 (0.4281) 0.6564 (0.4764) 0.7836 (0.4121)
Child uses father’s last name 0.7503 (0.4331) 0.7239 (0.4484) 0.7567 (0.4294)
Father’s name on birth cert. 0.8451 (0.362) 0.7975 (0.4031) 0.8567 (0.3506)
Paternity established 0.605 (0.4891) 0.5276 (0.5008) 0.6239 (0.4848)
Number of Observations 833 163 670
a Source: Author’s calculation from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study(FFCWS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Probit estimates of propensity score
Child is of low birth weight -0.0202 (0.0424)
Child is a boy -0.0034 (0.0275)
Child is mother’s first birth -0.1013 (0.0345)***
Mother’s age -0.0147 (0.0245)
Mother’s age squared 0.0001 (0.0005)
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White -0.0449 (0.0886)
Hispanic -0.1232 (0.0658)
Black -0.1216 (0.1114)
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School -0.1019 (0.0883)
High School -0.0918 (0.0781)
Some College -0.1294 (0.0619)*
PPVT score of the mother 0.0004 (0.0014)
Mother is working -0.0126 (0.0308)
Prenatal smoking by mother 0.0383 (0.036)
Prenatal drinking by mother -0.0015 (0.0477)
Mother is foreign born -0.0449 (0.0646)
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic -0.066 (0.0433)
Protestant -0.0344 (0.0375)
Other religion 0.0115 (0.0452)
Mother attends religious activity 0.009 (0.0291)
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 0.0851 (0.068)
$10, 000− $25, 000 0.1168 (0.1034)
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0− 49% 0.0988 (0.0657)
50− 99% 0.0076 (0.0499)
100− 199% 0.036 (0.0795)
Days in a week mother reads story 0.0061 (0.0066)
No. of adults in household 0.0624 (0.0156)***
No. of kids in household -0.0111 (0.0122)
Mother meets depression criteria -0.0473 (0.0301)
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth -0.1243 (0.0403)***
Child uses father’s last name 0.0306 (0.0376)
Father’s name on birth cert. -0.0242 (0.049)
Paternity established -0.0444 (0.0316)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Marginal effects instead of the coefficients are reported.
c Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Estimated Effect of Social Father on Child PPVT Score
OLS Gaussian Epanechnikov Uniform
0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01
Estimate -2.955** -2.755* -3.299* -3.043* -3.398* -3.008** -3.782**
Standard Error 1.406 1.461 1.699 1.579 1.794 1.492 1.744
No. of Observations treated 163 163 163 163 162 163 162
No. of Observations control 670 670 670 670 666 670 666
% Matched treated — 100 100 100 99 100 99
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. *Denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Source: Author’s calculation from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study(FFCWS).
c Robust standard error is reported for the OLS estimates.
d Bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replications are reported for the propensity score matching estimates.
Table 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis on Estimated Effect of Social Father on Child PPVT
Score
s=0.1 s=0.2 s=0.3 s=0.4 s=0.5
Λ ∈ [1.4, 2] Λ ∈ [2.3, 2.9] Λ ∈ [3.9, 4.7] Λ ∈ [7.2, 9.6] Λ ∈ [18.4, 25.3]
d=-0.1 Γ ∈ [0.58, 0.7] -2.865** -2.582** -2.303* -2.085* -1.911*
(1.608) (1.426) (1.647) (1.404) (1.343)
d=-0.2 Γ ∈ [0.37, 0.43] -2.633** -2.212** -1.707 -1.357 -0.827
(1.264) (1.246) (1.511) (1.418) (1.594)
d=-0.3 Γ ∈ [0.24, 0.28] -2.377* -1.847 -1.038 -0.665 -0.148
(1.596) (1.444) (1.457) (1.536) (1.526)
d=-0.4 Γ ∈ [0.14, 0.17] -2.379* -1.505 -0.591 0.214 1.635
(1.266) (1.364) (1.365) (1.335) (1.52)
d=-0.5 Γ ∈ [0.08, 0.09] -1.71 -0.971 0.114 1.565 2.346
(1.615) (1.382) (1.653) (1.397) (1.575)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. *Denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Source: Author’s calculation from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study(FFCWS).
c Bootstrap standard errors are reported for estimates.
Table 2.5: Summary statistics on Health outcome and Behavioral outcomes
Sample Mean With Social Father Without Social Father
Asthma 0.2469 (0.4314) 0.2547 (0.4371) 0.2451 (0.4304)
CBCL Internalizing Behaviors 10.66 (6.16) 10.59 (5.66) 10.68 (6.28)
CBCL Externalizing Behaviors 14.97 (8.20) 15.71 (7.93) 14.81 (8.26)
ASBI 15.09 (2.71) 15.11 (2.65) 14.81 (2.72)
a Source: Author’s calculation from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Estimated Effect of Social Father on Child Health and Behavioral Out-
comes
OLS Gaussian Epanechnikov Uniform
0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01
Asthma
Estimate 0.0187 0.0119 0.0028 0.0129 0.0026 0.0106 0.0052
Standard Error 0.0401 0.0418 0.0448 0.0433 0.0514 0.0439 0.0499
No. of Observations treated 157 157 157 157 155 157 155
No. of Observations control 661 661 661 661 656 661 656
% Matched treated — 100 100 100 99 100 99
Internalizing Behavior
Estimate -0.5089 -0.4097 -0.3778 -0.5269 -0.3122 -0.5013 -0.3944
Standard Error 0.5659 0.5532 0.7402 0.5719 0.7446 0.6742 0.6653
No. of Observations treated 137 137 137 137 133 137 133
No. of Observations control 598 598 598 598 585 598 585
% Matched treated — 100 100 100 97 100 97
Externalizing Behavior
Estimate 0.2815 0.5007 -0.1063 0.3006 -0.1065 0.3221 -0.2347
Standard Error 0.7633 0.7601 0.9964 0.8599 1.046 0.7516 0.9298
No. of Observations treated 134 134 134 134 130 134 130
No. of Observations control 599 599 599 599 587 599 587
% Matched treated — 100 100 100 97 100 97
ASBI
Estimate 0.053 0.0716 0.0638 0.0859 0.0933 0.0762 0.0485
Standard Error 0.2676 0.2935 0.3262 0.3035 0.2955 0.2848 0.3104
No. of Observations treated 137 137 137 137 135 137 135
No. of Observations control 605 605 605 605 593 605 593
% Matched treated — 100 100 100 98 100 98
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. *Denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Source: Author’s calculation from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study(FFCWS).
c Robust standard error is reported for the OLS estimates.
d Bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replications are reported for the propensity score matching estimates.
84
2.A Appendix
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Table 2.A.1.1: Ordinary least squares estimates on Child PPVT Score
Social Father is present -2.9552 (1.406)**
Child is of low birth weight -4.9895 (1.8008)***
Child is a boy -1.3836 (1.0442)
Child is mother’s first birth 0.1192 (1.3329)
Mother’s age 0.9364 (0.9976)
Mother’s age squared -0.0178 (0.0189)
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White 2.7553 (4.1588)
Hispanic -1.5228 (4.0066)
Black -1.9058 (3.8356)
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School -4.8764 (3.492)
High School -4.1371 (3.4011)
Some College -2.1751 (3.3597)
PPVT score of the mother 0.2712 (0.0591)***
Mother is working 0.263 (1.1785)
Prenatal smoking by mother -0.2494 (1.3546)
Prenatal drinking by mother 4.073 (1.7195)**
Mother is foreign born -2.0534 (2.9588)
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic -0.6139 (1.7717)
Protestant -1.4468 (1.3829)
Other religion 0.5418 (1.7054)
Mother attends religious activity -0.5531 (1.0921)
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 6.1661 (3.3044)*
$10, 000− $25, 000 4.0105 (2.2599)*
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0-49% -6.4024 (3.865)*
50-99% -6.3143 (3.2176)**
100-199% -1.0021 (2.4602)
Days in a week mother reads story 0.6642 (0.255)***
No. of adults in household 1.1317 (0.5698)**
No. of kids in household -0.2171 (0.4485)
Mother meets depression criteria -1.498 (1.246)
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth 0.0429 (1.2824)
Child uses father’s last name 0.517 (1.4784)
Father’s name on birth cert. 0.7306 (1.665)
Paternity established -0.3435 (1.1755)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A.1.2: Ordinary least squares estimates on Asthma
Social Father is present 0.0187 (0.0401)
Child is of low birth weight 0.0689 (0.0533)
Child is a boy 0.1232 (0.0301)***
Child is mother’s first birth -0.0555 (0.0436)
Mother’s age 0.0124 (0.0254)
Mother’s age squared -0.0003 (0.0005)
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White 0.049 (0.0806)
Hispanic 0.1772 (0.0768)**
Black 0.1659 (0.0718)**
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School -0.0832 (0.104)
High School -0.0397 (0.1009)
Some College -0.0926 (0.0961)
PPVT score of the mother -0.0007 (0.0017)
Mother is working -0.0351 (0.0329)
Prenatal smoking by mother 0.0326 (0.0398)
Prenatal drinking by mother -0.0538 (0.0498)
Mother is foreign born -0.1092 (0.068)
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic 0.0142 (0.0548)
Protestant -0.0279 (0.0442)
Other religion -0.0038 (0.0522)
Mother attends religious activity 0.0585 (0.032)*
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 0.1717 (0.0905)*
$10, 000− $25, 000 0.0763 (0.0565)
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0-49% -0.1284 (0.1004)
50-99% -0.0664 (0.0756)
100-199% -0.0287 (0.0534)
Days in a week mother reads story 0.008 (0.0072)
No. of adults in household -0.019 (0.016)
No. of kids in household 0.0098 (0.0132)
Mother meets depression criteria 0.0179 (0.0356)
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth 0.0033 (0.0388)
Child uses father’s last name -0.0288 (0.044)
Father’s name on birth cert. 0.0557 (0.0521)
Paternity established 0.0021 (0.0346)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A.1.3: Ordinary least squares estimates on Internalizing Behavior
Social Father is present -0.5089 (0.566)
Child is of low birth weight 1.1093 (0.7005)
Child is a boy 0.3997 (0.4273)
Child is mother’s first birth -0.0221 (0.6129)
Mother’s age -0.2705 (0.3567)
Mother’s age squared 0.0044 (0.0064)
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White -1.2235 (1.7008)
Hispanic -1.4204 (1.6675)
Black -2.4779 (1.5862)
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School 3.716 (0.9574)***
High School 2.5347 (0.8535)***
Some College 1.3776 (0.8219)*
PPVT score of the mother -0.1385 (0.0269)***
Mother is working -0.7482 (0.4634)
Prenatal smoking by mother -0.3221 (0.5223)
Prenatal drinking by mother 0.4462 (0.7031)
Mother is foreign born -2.0638 (1.0415)**
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic -0.2247 (0.8287)
Protestant 0.1238 (0.6305)
Other religion -0.5901 (0.6752)
Mother attends religious activity -0.5093 (0.4606)
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 -1.7769 (1.2622)
$10, 000− $25, 000 -1.7389 (0.7943)**
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0-49% 1.5867 (1.3826)
50-99% 0.8516 (1.0586)
100-199% -0.4525 (0.7897)
Days in a week mother reads story -0.0941 (0.1105)
No. of adults in household 0.0834 (0.237)
No. of kids in household -0.0456 (0.204)
Mother meets depression criteria 1.3807 (0.5297)***
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth -1.0387 (0.5847)*
Child uses father’s last name -1.4896 (0.6396)**
Father’s name on birth cert. 0.5018 (0.8632)
Paternity established 0.3689 (0.4983)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A.1.4: Ordinary least squares estimates on Externalizing Behavior
Social Father is present 0.2816 (0.7634)
Child is of low birth weight 1.8349 (1.0099)*
Child is a boy 1.0418 (0.5948)*
Child is mother’s first birth -1.3323 (0.7872)*
Mother’s age -0.0066 (0.5216)
Mother’s age squared -0.0029 (0.0096)
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White -3.1107 (2.0363)
Hispanic -2.3013 (1.979)
Black -3.2684 (1.8755)*
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School 2.1082 (2.059)
High School 2.246 (1.9809)
Some College 1.152 (1.9382)
PPVT score of the mother -0.0739 (0.0338)**
Mother is working -1.0711 (0.6919)
Prenatal smoking by mother 0.3595 (0.7148)
Prenatal drinking by mother -0.0719 (1.0347)
Mother is foreign born -2.0518 (1.8376)
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic 0.0101 (1.1148)
Protestant -0.3208 (0.8396)
Other religion -0.4414 (0.9747)
Mother attends religious activity -0.8333 (0.6385)
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 0.6094 (1.7089)
$10, 000− $25, 000 -0.6725 (1.0935)
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0-49% -1.3617 (1.9528)
50-99% -0.7485 (1.4991)
100-199% -1.441 (1.1241)
Days in a week mother reads story -0.4442 (0.1504)***
No. of adults in household 0.5629 (0.3538)
No. of kids in household -0.0177 (0.281)
Mother meets depression criteria 1.9663 (0.7219)***
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth -1.4974 (0.7868)*
Child uses father’s last name -2.7939 (0.8796)***
Father’s name on birth cert. 1.9139 (1.1297)*
Paternity established 0.3238 (0.669)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.A.1.5: Ordinary least squares estimates on ASBI
Social Father is present 0.053 (0.2677)
Child is of low birth weight -0.1122 (0.2861)
Child is a boy -0.4903 (0.19)***
Child is mother’s first birth -0.1361 (0.2615)
Mother’s age -0.4119 (0.1545)***
Mother’s age squared 0.007 (0.0028)**
Mother’s race (Ref: Other race)
White 1.1574 (0.7814)
Hispanic 0.71 (0.7603)
Black 0.6371 (0.7395)
Mother’s education (Ref: College)
Less than High School -1.1243 (0.6499)*
High School -0.9332 (0.6192)
Some College -0.6539 (0.6096)
PPVT score of the mother 0.0466 (0.0109)***
Mother is working 0.0406 (0.2068)
Prenatal smoking by mother 0.0014 (0.2379)
Prenatal drinking by mother 0.082 (0.3176)
Mother is foreign born -0.0049 (0.6313)
Mother’s religion (Ref: No Religion)
Catholic -0.3083 (0.3581)
Protestant 0.0847 (0.2722)
Other religion 0.6004 (0.2916)**
Mother attends religious activity -0.0601 (0.196)
Child’s Household Income (Ref: > $25, 000)
<= $10, 000 0.1053 (0.6137)
$10, 000− $25, 000 0.2376 (0.341)
Child’s Household Poverty Ratio (Ref: >= 200%)
0-49% -0.7391 (0.6675)
50-99% -0.2095 (0.4555)
100-199% 0.0768 (0.3256)
Days in a week mother reads story -0.0055 (0.0435)
No. of adults in household -0.107 (0.1042)
No. of kids in household -0.0248 (0.0919)
Mother meets depression criteria -0.3195 (0.2265)
Parents in romantic relationship at childbirth 0.2227 (0.2705)
Child uses father’s last name 0.3226 (0.2652)
Father’s name on birth cert. -0.3173 (0.3471)
Paternity established 0.3695 (0.2356)
a ***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level,
and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
b Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
90
2.A.2 Detailed Description for Items used in Behavior Out-
comes
Table 2.A.2.1: Detailed Description for Items used in Behavior Outcomes
Item Description
Internalizing Behavior (α = 0.822) Clings to adults or is too dependent
Feelings are easily hurt
Gets too upset when separated from parents
Looks unhappy without good reason
Nervous, high strung, or tense
Overtired
Self-conscious or easily embarrassed
Too shy or timid
Too fearful or anxious
Unhappy, sad, depressed
Wants a lot of attention
Acts too young for age
Avoids looking others in the eye
Doesn’t answer when people talk to (him/her)
Doesn’t get along with other children
Doesn’t know how to have fun, or acts like little adult
Doesn’t seem to feel guilty after misbehaving
Refuses to play games
Seems unresponsive to affection
Shows little affection toward people
Shows little interest in things around (him/her)
Stubborn, sullen, or irritable
Uncooperative
Under active, slow moving, or lacks energy
Withdrawn -does not get involved with others
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page) Item Description
Externalizing Behavior (α = 0.890) Defiant
Demands must be met immediately
Disobedient
Easily frustrated
Easily jealous
Gets in many fights
Hits others
Has angry moods
Punishment doesn’t change (his/her) behavior
Screams a lot
Selfish or won’t share
Has sudden changes in mood or feelings
Has temper tantrums or hot temper
Unusually loud
Whiny
Can’t concentrate, can’t pay attention for long
Cruel to animals
Destroys his/her own things
Destroys things belonging to his family or other children
Gets into everything
Hurts animals or people without meaning to
Quickly shifts from one activity to another
ASBI (α = 0.726) Understands others’ feelings
Sympathetic to other children’s distress
Open and direct about what (he/she) wants
Will join a group of children playing
Plays games and talks with other children
Confident with other people
Tends to be proud of things (he/she) does
Interested in many and different things
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page) Item Description
Enjoys talking with you
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Chapter 3
Is Late Parenting Associated with Late Retirement?
3.1 Introduction
The norms for parenthood have drastic changes in recent years. In particular, people
are more likely to have children in later ages. Delayed parenthood has been docu-
mented in recent literature (Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006). The mean age of mother
at first birth has risen from 21.8 in 1975 to 25.4 in 2010. Also, the birth rate for
women aged 30-34 rose from 52.3 births per 1000 women in 1975 to 96.5 births per
1000 women in 2010. During the same period, the birth rate for women aged 20-24
went down from 113 births to 90 births per 1000 women. The birth rate for women
aged 15-19 also went down from 55.6 births to 34.2 births per 1000 women in the
same period (Mathews and Hamilton, 2002; Martin et al., 2012). More people will
enter the retiring age while their first child is still in college. For example, in Health
and Retirement Study(HRS), one out of five children of the respondents lived with
their parents. In this group of children, 30% of them were under 18 years of age
(McGarry and Schoeni, 1995). With the increasing trend of delayed parenthood, it
is interesting to examine how this trend is associated with other major family and
individual decisions.
The relationship between timing of parenthood and timing of retirement is not
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well understood. With more people facing retirement in the near future, their retire-
ment decisions would have significant impact on the economy. Detailed understand-
ing of how people make their retirement decision is important for policy makers and
economists. Factors such as pensions, social security benefits, respondents’ character-
istics including education level, health status, and wealth level are the most studied
determinants in traditional economics studies on retirement decision. Nonetheless,
the timing of parenthood and its possible effect on retirement are often neglected.
In some of the studies, the timing of parenthood may be more likely to be one of
the control variables. It would be of minor interest and no details would be explored
about its relationship with the timing of retirement. Another possibility is that the
timing of parenthood is completely omitted from the studies. However, if the associ-
ation between the timing of parenthood and retirement decision significantly exists,
its omission may bias the other estimates.
Research on the relationship between timing of parenthood and timing of retire-
ment is lacking. A closely related topic in the relationship between women career
outcome and fertility decision has long been investigated by economists1. However,
not much has been worked specifically on the relationship between the timing of par-
enthood and retirement decision. Only a few studies on the effect of childlessness on
retirement decision was found. In Szinovacz, DeViney, and Davey (2001), the like-
lihood of retiring for American aged 55-75 were studied. Childlessness is one of the
factors investigated in their study. Mixed results were found in their study. The effect
of childlessness on the likelihood was different by gender and marital status, which
seems to suggest the effect is subgroup-specific. For example, childless nonmarried
men were more likely to postpone their retirement because of their lack of family ties.
Also, married childless women were relatively less likely to retire.
1Examples of this line of research included Mincer (1962), Hofferth (1984), Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980), MaCurdy (1981), Hotz and Miller (1988), Bronars and Grogger (1994), Jacob-
sen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999), Angrist and Evans (1998), Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (2005),
Angrist and Evans (1999), Goldin and Katz (2002), Bailey (2006).
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Hank (2004) also analyzed the relationship between childbearing and retirement
in Western Germany. The sample consisted of 50-69 women in Western Germany.
The major focus of Hank’s study was about women’s reproductive history. Several
variables were used as the indicators of reproductive history including a binary vari-
able of whether the respondent ever had a child, a measure of the number of children,
and a binary variable of the timing of fertility for which Hank used age 24 at first
birth as the separator between early and late fertility. Hank found that women having
children tend to delay their retirement. On the other hand, delayed fertility was also
found to lead to delayed retirement for women.
Pienta (1999) also studied the relationship between early childbearing decisions
and labor force participation in later life. Women aged 55-64 are the sample in her
study. Two major measures of early childbearing decisions were used. The first
measure is the number of children ever born to the woman. The other one is the
timing of first birth for which age 30 were used as the separator. She found that
women who delayed childbearing were more likely to delay their retirement as well.
On the other hand, childless women tended to retire earlier relatively.
The purpose of this study is to find the association between the timing of parent-
hood and the timing of retirement. It is very likely that there exists the possible joint
determination of parenthood timing and retirement timing. Without effective method
to address this problem, I won’t be able to identify the casual effect of parenthood
timing on the timing of retirement. Instead of finding the casual effect, the simple
association between parenthood timing and retirement timing will be identified.
Using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I found that parents who have
their first child before or at age 30 retired earlier than parents who have their first child
after age 30. The positive association between early parenthood and early retirement
still exists for different sub-groups such as college degree holder, non-college degree
holder, high net worth group and low net worth group. I also found the association
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between late retirement and giving children financial help. The association between
late parenting and late retirement still exists but becomes weaker after conditional on
giving the children financial help. It seems that part but not all association between
late parenting and late retirement is related to giving financial help to the children
during retiring age.
Although this study is not able to identify the casual effect between late parent-
hood and late retirement, a positive association between them is found. It is possible
that the timing of parenthood has casual effect on the timing of retirement. With
more people delaying their parenthood and a large group of people entering their
retiring age, it is very important for policy makers and economists to understand how
late parenthood would affect the timing of retirement. Further research is needed to
fill this gap.
3.2 Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is the main data set to be used in this
paper. The HRS is a longitudinal survey of households and individuals. The HRS is
conducted every two years, and ten waves of the data are now available. The first
wave is collected in 1992, containing information on 12,652 individuals from 7,607
households. The whole survey contains detailed information of the individuals such
as demographics, family structure and transfers, income and net worth, housing,
health and other characteristics related to retirement.
The paper focuses on the association between the timing of parenthood and the
timing of retirement. In this paper, early parents are defined as the people who have
their first child before or at age 30. Late parents are defined as the people who have
their first children after age 30. This definition is used throughout the whole paper.
In order to compare the difference between early parents and late parents, a list of
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variables will be presented in the result2.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Whole sample
Simple statistics suggest that the age of having the first child have some relationship
with the retiring age and the age to claim social security. Individuals who have their
first child before the age of 30 tend to retire earlier (61.95) than the people who have
their first child after 30 (62.95). Moreover, early parents are more likely to have
claimed their social security benefit at age 62 (41.3%) than late parents (32.7%)3.
Difference in demographics between early parents and late parents is also found. For
example, only 18% of early parents have college degree while 30% of late parents
have college degree. Table 1 summarizes the difference in characteristics between
early parents and late parents.
There are also differences between early parents and late parents on the percep-
tions of work and retirement. HRS contains questions addressing those issues. In
the first wave of HRS, individuals were asked the following two questions about their
thoughts on retirement: “Thinking about work generally and not just your present
job, what do you think are the chances that you will be working full-time after you
reach age 62?”; “And what about the chances that you will be working full-time after
you reach age 65?” The respondents give a value ranging from zero to ten, in which
zero indicates absolutely no chance and ten indicates absolutely certain. The results
of these two questions are displayed in Table 1. For early parents, the average values
they gave are 4.78 and 2.58 respectively. Both values are significantly lower than that
of late parents which are 5.75 and 3.75 respectively. There is another question asking
2Details of the variables are displayed in the tables.
3Statistical tests showed that the difference between early parents and late parents are significant.
Please refer to the table.
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about the perception of health. “What about the chances that your health will limit
your work activity during the next 10 years?” Again, the respondents give a value
ranging from zero (absolutely no chance) to ten (absolutely certain). The average
value of early parents is 4.00 while late parents have an average of 4.02. Both groups
have very similar perception of health. Their perception of health does not contribute
to the difference in perception of work. Based on the results, it is reasonable to claim
that early parents feel that working is less enjoyable than late parents when they
approach their retiring age.
A significant portion of children of late parents may still be in college or just
graduated from college when their parents are approaching retiring age. Thus, they
are more likely to be in need of financial assistance from their parents than the children
of early parents. Early parents are on average 12 years younger than late parents
when they have the first child. They are also 8 years younger than late parents when
they have the last child. Statistics from HRS also showed that late parents are more
likely than early parents to give children financial assistance in the past year, about
17 percentage points’ difference. Also, the average amount of financial assistance
among late parents is significantly larger than that among early parents. Moreover,
a question about the chance of giving financial help in the future is asked. “What
do you think are the chances that you [or your (husband/wife/partner)] will have
to give major financial help to family members during the next 10 years?” Again,
respondents gave a value ranging from zero (absolutely no chance) to ten (absolutely
certain). The average value that late parents gave (4.79) is significantly higher than
that of early parents (4.08).
3.3.2 Conditional on individual’s financial situation
The statistics above showed that early parents and late parents have significant dif-
ferences in the likelihood of giving financial assistance and the amount of financial
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assistance to their children. In this section, I take a deeper look on how the timing
of retirement associates with individual’s financial situation. I first focus on whether
the person gives children financial assistance in the past year.
By comparing people who gave children financial assistance in the past year to
people who didn’t give children financial assistance in the past year, I found that
the former retired later (62.01) than the latter (61.48). The difference is statistically
significant. Table 2 summarizes the difference in characteristics between these two
groups of people. Apart from the timing of retirement, some other differences between
these two groups of people can be noticed. One significance difference is the timing
of having child. The people who didn’t give children financial assistance in the past
year are significantly younger (22.28, 29.47) than the other group (23.7, 30.47) when
they have the first and last child.
The people who gave children financial assistance in the past year have significant
better health than the people who didn’t give children financial assistance. The former
group has a higher score on average in self-defined health index (0.858 vs. 0.727).
They also perceived a lower chance of having limit work activity by bad health in
the near future (3.84 vs. 4.09). Similar results were found when they were asked
about their chance of living after age 75 and age 85. In sum, having better health is
associated with a higher chance to give children financial assistance.
Another difference between the two groups is their earnings and net worth. Peo-
ple who gave children financial assistance have a significantly higher earnings and
net worth than the other group. This is consistent with the economic theory as
higher earnings and wealth should associate with a higher chance to give the children
financial help.
Next, I compare the difference between early parents and late parents conditional
on whether they gave children financial help in the past year. Table 3 summarizes
the difference in characteristics between early parents and late parents for people
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who didn’t give their children financial help in the past year. Table 4 summarizes
the difference in characteristics between early parents and late parents for people
who gave their children financial help in the past year. Data again showed that early
parents retired earlier than late parents, though it is no longer statistically significant.
They also have a higher chance to claim social security benefit at age 62, which is only
significant for people who gave children financial help. One key difference between
early parents and late parents after conditional on giving children financial help is
that late parents (4.012, 5.361) expected a higher chance to give financial help to
family members, compared to early parents (3.263, 4.91).
The association between late parenting and late retirement still exists but is weaker
after conditional on giving the children financial help. It seems that part of the
association between late parenting and late retirement is related to giving the children
financial help during retiring age. When people have the first child at older age, the
parents may have a higher chance to give the children financial help when the parents
entering their retiring age. In order to be able to meet the financial need of the child,
a direct way for the parents is to delay their retirement. This may explain the weaker
association between late parenting and late retirement after conditional on giving the
children financial help.
The ability of giving out financial assistance may depend on how much the net
worth the person has. I further compare the difference between early parents and
late parents conditional on their net worth. I divide the sample into two groups. One
group has net worth of $100,000 or less while the other group has net worth above
$100,000. Table 5 summarizes the difference in characteristics between early parents
and late parents for the low net worth group. Table 6 summarizes the difference in
characteristics between early parents and late parents for the high net worth group.
Again, early parents retired earlier than late parents according to their self-reported
retiring age after conditioning on their net worth. Also, a higher percentage of early
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parents claimed social security at age 62 than that of late parents for the high net
worth group.
Conditional on the net worth, there is also difference between early parents and
late parents on the perceptions of work and retirement. For the low net worth group,
the average values for the questions on working full-time at age 62 and 65 are 5.11
and 2.81 respectively for early parents. Both values are significantly lower than that
of late parents which are 5.9 and 3.87. For the high net worth group, the average
values are 4.50 and 2.38 respectively for early parents. Both values are significantly
lower than that of late parents which are 5.61 and 3.64. For the question about the
perception on health, no difference is found between early parents and late parents
for both the low net worth group and the high net worth group. Thus, the perception
of health does not contribute to the difference in perception of work. Conditional on
the net worth, early parents and late parents have different feeling on working and
retirement.
Similar to the whole sample, a significant portion of children of late parents may
still be in college or just graduated from college when their parents are approaching
retiring age. For the low net worth group, early parents are on average 12 years
younger than late parents when they have the first child. They are also 8 years
younger than late parents when they have the last child. For the high net worth
group, early parents are on average 11 years younger than late parents when they
have the first child. They are also 7 years younger than late parents when they have
the last child.
Conditional on the net worth, late parents are more likely than early parents
to give children financial assistance in the past year, about 16 percentage points’
difference for low net worth group and 17 percentage points’ difference for high net
worth group. Moreover, for the question about the chance of giving financial help in
the future, the values for late parents (4.6, 4.9) are significantly higher than those of
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early parents (3.9, 4.3).
3.3.3 College degree holder and non-college degree holder
As mentioned above, a significant higher percentage of late parents have a college
degree than early parents. Zhivan (2009) suggested that college graduates have less
physically demanding job and enjoy working more than non-college graduates. Be-
cause of that, non-college graduates will tend to retire earlier than college graduates.
In order to focus on the association between timing of parenthood and timing of re-
tirement, I compare the difference between early parents and late parents conditional
on whether the individuals have a college degree. Table 7 summarizes the difference
in characteristics between early parents and late parents for college graduates. Table
8 summarizes the difference in characteristics between early parents and late parents
for non-college graduates.
Consistent with the finding by Zhivan (2009), non-college graduates tend to retire
earlier than college graduates according to their self-reported retiring age. Also,
non-college graduates are more likely to claim social security at age 62 than college
graduates. However, conditional on whether the individual has a college degree,
there is also a significant difference in retirement timing between early parents and
late parents. For college graduates, a significantly higher percentage of early parents
claims social security at age 62 than late parents. For non-college graduates, early
parents retire earlier than late parents according to their self-reported retiring age.
Also, a significant higher percentage of early parents claims social security at age 62
than late parents.
Similar to the whole sample, there is also difference between early parents and
late parents on the perception of work and retirement conditional on the holding
a college degree. For the group of college degree holder, the average values for the
questions on working full-time at age 62 and 65 are 5.09 and 2.94 respectively for early
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parents. Both values are significantly lower than that of late parents which are 6.05
and 4.18. For the group of non-college degree holder, the average values are 4.7 and
2.48 respectively for early parents. Both values are significantly lower than that of
late parents which are 5.57 and 3.49. For the question about the perception on health,
no difference is found between early parents and late parents for both the group of
college degree holder and the group of non-college degree holder. Thus, the perception
of health does not contribute to the difference in perception of work. Again, whether
the individual is a degree holder or not cannot explain all the difference between
early parents and late parents. Even conditional on the status of degree holder,
early parents and late parents have different feeling on working and retirement. This
difference may be a reason why there exists a difference in retiring timing between
these two types of parents.
Similar to the whole sample, a significant portion of children of late parents may
still be in college or just graduated from college when their parents are approaching
retiring age, no matter whether the parents have college degree or not. For college
degree holder, early parents are on average 10 years younger than late parents when
they have the first child. They are also 6 years younger than late parents when they
have the last child. For non-college degree holder, early parents are on average 12
years younger than late parents when they have the first child. They are also 8 years
younger than late parents when they have the last child.
For both the group of college degree holder and the group of non-college degree
holder, late parents are more likely than early parents to give children financial as-
sistance in the past year, about 19 percentage points’ difference for college degree
holder and 10 percentage points’ difference for non-college degree holder. Also, the
average amount of financial assistance among late parents is significantly larger than
that among early parents, no matter whether the individual has college degree or not.
Moreover, for the question about the chance of giving financial help in the future, the
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values for late parents (5.1, 4.6) are significantly higher than those of early parents
(4.4, 3.9).
3.3.4 Conditional on gender
Conditional on gender, there is also significant difference between early parents and
late parents. Table 9 summarizes the difference in characteristics between early par-
ents and late parents for male. Table 10 summarizes the difference in characteristics
between early parents and late parents for female. It can be seen that a higher per-
centage of early parents claimed social security at age 62 than that of late parents for
both male and female. Early parents also retired earlier than late parents according
to their self-reported retiring age for male.
Similar to the whole sample, there is also difference between early parents and
late parents on the perception of work and retirement conditional on gender. For
male, the average values for the questions on working full-time at age 62 and 65 are
5.25 and 2.94 respectively for early parents. Both values are significantly lower than
that of late parents which are 6.06 and 3.99. For female, the average values are 4.32
and 2.20 respectively for early parents. Both values are significantly lower than that
of late parents which are 4.81 and 2.97. For the question about the perception on
health, no difference is found between early parents and late parents for both male
and female. Thus, the perception of health does not contribute to the difference in
perception of work. Again, conditional on gender, early parents and late parents have
different feeling on working and retirement.
For male, early parents are on average 11 years younger than late parents when
they have the first child. They are also 7 years younger than late parents when they
have the last child. For female, early parents are on average 12 years younger than
late parents when they have the first child. They are also 6 years younger than
late parents when they have the last child. A significant portion of children of late
105
parents may still be in college or just graduated from college when their parents are
approaching retiring age for both male and female. Thus, late parents are more likely
than early parents to give children financial assistance in the past year, about 14
percentage points’ difference for male and 16 percentage points’ difference female.
Also, the average amount of financial assistance among late parents is significantly
larger than that among early parents, for both groups of male and female. Moreover,
for the question about the chance of giving financial help in the future, the values for
late parents (4.7, 4.7) are significantly higher than those of early parents (4.0, 4.3).
3.3.5 Conditional on individual’s timing of having the last
child
Apart from having different timing of having the first child, early parents and late
parents also differ significantly in their timing of having the last child. In previous
section, I found that late retirement is associated with giving the children financial
help. The last child is the youngest among all children such that that child may have
a higher chance than other children of needing financial help from the parents. Thus,
the timing of having the last child may also associate with the timing of retirement.
In this section, I compare people who have their last child before or at age 35 to
people who have their last children after age 35. I found that the former retired earlier
(61.81) than the latter (62.87). The difference is statistically significant. Moreover,
the former is more likely to have claimed their social security benefit at age 62 (41.9%)
than the latter (35%). The difference again is statistically significant. The results are
very similar to the case when I compare early parents and late parents according to the
timing of having the first child. Table 11 summarizes the difference in characteristics
between these two groups of people. In sum, the difference between early and late
parents defined by the timing of having the last child is very similar to the difference
between early and late parents defined by the timing of having the first child.
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Next, I compare the difference between early parents and late parents conditional
on whether the parents have the last child after age 35. Table 12 summarizes the
difference in characteristics between early parents and late parents for people who
have the last child after age 35. Table 13 summarizes the difference in characteristics
between early parents and late parents for people who have the last child before or
at age 35. Data again showed that early parents (62.66, 61.79) retired earlier than
late parents (63.33, 62.29) and the difference is statistically significant for people
who have the last child after age 35. Early parents (0.37, 0.422) also have a higher
chance to claim social security benefit at age 62 than late parents (0.309, 0.362) and
the difference is statistically significant. Results showed that the association between
late parenting, defined by the timing of having the first child, and late retirement still
exists even after conditional on the timing of having the last child.
3.4 Future Direction
This study only finds a positive association between late parenthood and late retire-
ment but is not able to find the casual relationship between the two. Methods used
in related research may shed light on future research.
A closely related topic in the relationship between women career outcome and
fertility decision has long been investigated by economists. Mincer (1962) was the
first of them to examine the relationship and found a negative correlation between
fertility and women labor supply. Since then, many studies have investigated the
effect of childbearing on all kinds of labor market outcome. Some studies work under
a simplified assumption that fertility timing is exogenous both in cross-sectional data
(Hofferth, 1984) and panel data (e.g. Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; MaCurdy, 1981).
However, this assumption of exogeneity is too simple and may not be too realistic.
The possible joint determination of fertility and labor market decisions compli-
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cates the identification of causality between fertility and labor market outcomes. The
simplifying assumption of exogenous fertility timing fails to address the possibility
of joint determination. To solve this problem, some studies build parametric struc-
tural model of labor supply and fertility and estimate the model using simultaneous
equations (e.g. Moffitt, 1984; Hotz and Miller, 1988).
Instrumental variables (IV) method has also been widely used to identify the
causal effect of fertility on labor supply. Biological fertility event is one of the in-
strument candidates. Bronars and Grogger (1994) used the event of having a twin
birth as instrument to estimate the effect of unexpected second child on labor force
participation for unwed women. Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999) applied
the same strategy in the model using married women as sample. Angrist and Evans
(1998) used the sex composition of the first two children as instrument. Their ra-
tionale behind sex composition is that parents favor a mix of sexes. Thus, parents
with two same sex children would be more likely to have the third child than those
with one boy and one girl. Biological shocks such as miscarriages are also used as
instrument (Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders, 2005).
Legislative changes have also been used as instruments in several studies. Angrist
and Evans (1999) used 1970 state abortion reforms as instrument to find the effect of
fertility on labor force participation. Goldin and Katz (2002) studied the relationship
between fertility and labor market participation in an indirect way. They claimed
that law changes promoted the freedom of using birth control pill and this freedom
enabled women to delay their marriage and invest more in professional occupations.
Bailey (2006) used similar strategy as Goldin and Katz (2002). She found that pill
use delayed women’s motherhood timing and increased women’s participation in labor
force.
The methods mentioned above, such as instrumental variable method, can be used
in the future to estimate the casual relationship between the timing of parenthood
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and the timing of retirement. Given a rich data set, information and variables needed
for using the instrumental variable method may be available.
3.5 Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to find the association between the timing of
parenthood and the timing of retirement. Not many past studies worked specifically
on the relationship between the timing of parenthood and timing of retirement. This
paper identified the simple association between parenthood timing and retirement
timing, rather than identified the casual effect of parenthood timing on the timing of
retirement.
The key finding of this study is that early parents tend to retire earlier than late
parents. The positive association between early parenthood and early retirement still
holds conditional on whether the person has a college degree or not. The positive
relationship also holds conditional on the person’s net worth. Although part of the
association between late parenting and late retirement is related to giving the children
financial help during retiring age, the general picture is that late parenting and late
retirement is positively correlated.
The positive association between late parenthood and late retirement has impor-
tant policy implications. This study raises the possibility that the timing of parent-
hood may have casual effect on the timing of retirement. With a large group of people
entering their retiring age and a significant portion of people delaying the parenthood,
it is very important for policy makers and economists to understand how the timing
of parenthood associates with the timing of retirement. Further research is necessary
to fill this gap.
109
Bibliography
Angrist, J.D., and W.N. Evans (1998). Children and Their Parents’ Labor Supply:
Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family Size. American Economic Review,
88: 450-477.
Angrist, J.D., and W.N. Evans (1999). Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of
the 1970 State Abortion Reforms. Research in Labor Economics, 18: 75-113.
Bailey, M.J. (2006). More Power to the Pill: The Impact of Contraceptive Freedom
on Women’s Life Cycle Labor Supply. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121:
289-320.
Bronars, S.G., and J. Grogger (1994). The Economic Consequences of Unwed Moth-
erhood: Using Twin Births as a Natural Experiment. American Economic Review,
84: 1141-1156.
Goldin, C., and L. Katz (2002). The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 110: 730-
770.
Hank, K. (2004). Effects of Early Life Family Events on Women’s Late Life Labour
Market Behavior: An Analysis of the Relationship between Child-bearing and Re-
tirement in Western Germany. European Sociological Review, 20: 189-198.
110
Heckman, J.J., and T.E. MaCurdy (1980). A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour
Supply. Review of Economic Studies, 47: 47-74.
Hofferth, S. (1984). Long-Term Economic Consequences for Women of Delayed Child-
bearing and Reduced Family Size. Demography, 21: 141-155.
Hotz, V.J., and R.A. Miller (1988). An Empirical Analysis of Life Cycle Fertility and
Female Labor Supply. Econometrica, 56: 91-118.
Hotz, V.J., S.W. McElroy, and S.G. Sanders (2005). Teenage Childbearing and Its
Life Cycle Consequences: Exploiting a Natural Experiment. Journal of Human
Resources, 40: 683-715.
Jacobsen, J.P., J.W. Pearce III, and J.L. Rosenbloom (1999). The Effects of Child-
bearing on Married Women’s Labor Supply and Earnings: Using Twin Births as a
Natural Experiment. Journal of HumanResources, 34: 449-474.
Lesthaeghe, R.J., and L. Neidert (2006). The Second Demographic Transition in the
United States: Exception or Textbook Example? Population and Development
Review, 32: 669-698.
MaCurdy, T.E. (1981). An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting.
Journal of Political Economy, 89: 1059-85.
Martin, J.A., B.E. Hamilton, S.J. Ventura, M.J.K. Osterman, E.C. Wilson, and T.J.
Mathews (2012). Births: Final Data for 2010. National Vital Statistics Reports, 61:
1-71.
Mathews, T.J., and B.E. Hamilton (2002). Mean Age of Mothers, 1970-2000. National
Vital Statistics Reports, 51: 1-13.
111
McGarry, K., and R.F. Schoeni (1995). Transfer Behavior in the Health and Retire-
ment Study: Measurement and the Redistribution of Resources within the Family.
Journal of Human Resources, 30:S184-S226.
Mincer, J. (1962). Labour Force Participation of Married Women. In Aspects of La-
borEconomics, Lewis H.G. (ed.). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp:63-
105.
Moffitt, R. (1984). Profiles of Fertility, Labor Supply and Wages of Married Women:
a Complete Life-Cycle Model. Review of Economic Studies, 51: 263-278.
Pienta, A. (1999). Early Childbearing Patterns and Women’s Labor Force Behavior
in Later Life. Journal of Women and Aging, 11: 69-84.
Szinovacz, M.E., S. DeViney, and A. Davey (2001). Influences of Family Obligations
and Relationships on Retirement: Variations by Gender, Race, and Marital Status.
Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 56B: S20-S27.
Zhivan, N.A. (2009). Using Educational Attainment to Simplify a Dynamic Model of
Retirement. Unpublished manuscript.
112
Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 61.95 (5.610) 62.95 (5.694)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.413 (0.492) 0.327 (0.469)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 56.22 (4.092) 58.09 (5.752)
College Degree*** 0.184 (0.387) 0.302 (0.459)
Male*** 0.471 (0.499) 0.746 (0.436)
Age of having first child*** 22.94 (3.446) 34.81 (4.066)
Age of having last child*** 30.51 (5.869) 38.17 (5.137)
Number of children*** 3.338 (1.739) 2.089 (1.247)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 4.786 (3.958) 5.751 (3.859)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.582 (3.391) 3.751 (3.775)
Health is good 0.794 (0.404) 0.782 (0.413)
Mental health is good 0.832 (0.374) 0.828 (0.3778)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.006 (2.814) 4.025 (2.663)
Chance will live > 75** 6.503 (2.930) 6.735 (2.861)
Chance will live > 85 4.321 (3.194) 4.422 (3.184)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 35.41 (37.50) 41.14 (51.19)
Networth (in thousand)*** 234.2 (489.6) 281.1 (620.9)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.367 (0.482) 0.525 (0.500)
Financial assistance (in thousand)*** 1.841 (7.967) 3.613 (10.52)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.079 (3.129) 4.782 (3.410)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.2: Individuals’ characteristics by whether the parents gave child financial
assistance in past year
Gave Didn’t give
financial assistance financial assistance
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 62.01 (5.43) 61.48 (5.59)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62 0.406 (0.491) 0.414 (0.493)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 55.19 (3.5) 55.76 (3.47)
College Degree*** 0.256 (0.437) 0.1 (0.3)
Male 0.097 (0.296) 0.089 (0.285)
Age of having first child*** 23.7 (4.79) 22.28 (4.32)
Age of having last child*** 30.47 (5.45) 29.47 (5.76)
Number of children*** 3.094 (1.61) 3.384 (1.936)
Expect to work full time at 62 4.452 (3.869) 4.403 (3.956)
Expect to work full time at 65 2.305 (3.232) 2.349 (3.303)
Health is good*** 0.858 (0.349) 0.727 (0.446)
Mental health is good*** 0.848 (0.359) 0.777 (0.416)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years** 3.844 (2.717) 4.092 (2.871)
Chance will live > 75*** 7.003 (2.722) 6.331 (3.009)
Chance will live > 85*** 4.892 (3.145) 4.335 (3.24)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 43.63 (46.01) 23.36 (25.23)
Networth (in thousand) *** 281.7 (537.22) 169.43 (414.09)
Give child financial assistance in past year 1 (0) 0 (0)
Financial assistance (in thousand) 5.19 (12.63) 0 (0)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.953 (3.087) 3.307 (3.078)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.3: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for parents who didn’t
give child financial assistance in past year
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age 61.49 (5.6) 61.81 (5.29)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62 0.416 (0.493) 0.397 (0.491)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS 55.76 (3.47) 55.94 (3.63)
College Degree* 0.099 (0.299) 0.138 (0.346)
Male*** 0.083 (0.276) 0.218 (0.414)
Age of having first child*** 21.59 (3.27) 34.07 (3.02)
Age of having last child*** 29.04 (5.59) 36.32 (3.73)
Number of children*** 3.418 (1.865) 1.753 (0.932)
Expect to work full time at 62 4.417 (3.955) 4.384 (3.917)
Expect to work full time at 65 2.331 (3.298) 2.786 (3.417)
Health is good** 0.735 (0.441) 0.667 (0.473)
Mental health is good 0.779 (0.415) 0.776 (0.418)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.064 (2.873) 4.327 (2.776)
Chance will live > 75 6.329 (2.979) 6.257 (3.318)
Chance will live > 85 4.346 (3.229) 4.054 (3.228)
Earnings (in thousand) 23.54 (25.19) 24.94 (28.23)
Networth (in thousand) 173.32 (408.8) 124.34 (408.17)
Give child financial assistance in past year 0 (0) 0 (0)
Financial assistance (in thousand) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 3.263 (3.035) 4.012 (3.595)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level.
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Table 3.4: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for parents who gave
child financial assistance in past year
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age 61.96 (5.43) 62.51 (5.38)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62* 0.414 (0.493) 0.345 (0.477)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 55.12 (3.49) 55.89 (3.61)
College Degree*** 0.239 (0.426) 0.411 (0.493)
Male*** 0.085 (0.279) 0.208 (0.407)
Age of having first child*** 22.58 (3.42) 33.81 (3.26)
Age of having last child*** 29.87 (5.25) 36.02 (3.71)
Number of children*** 3.229 (1.582) 1.792 (1.206)
Expect to work full time at 62* 4.389 (3.868) 5.023 (3.844)
Expect to work full time at 65** 2.245 (3.208) 2.941 (3.438)
Health is good 0.859 (0.349) 0.849 (0.359)
Mental health is good 0.851 (0.356) 0.844 (0.364)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 3.81 (2.738) 4.045 (2.483)
Chance will live > 75 7.013 (2.711) 7.006 (2.752)
Chance will live > 85 4.864 (3.134) 5.161 (3.208)
Earnings (in thousand) 43.23 (42.84) 47.89 (68.93)
Networth (in thousand) 281.09 (524.62) 301.22 (655.37)
Give child financial assistance in past year 1 (0) 1 (0)
Financial assistance (in thousand)** 5.02 (12.54) 6.89 (13.75)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years** 4.91 (3.048) 5.361 (3.373)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level.
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Table 3.5: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for low net worth
group
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age** 61.85 (5.616) 62.51 (5.473)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62 0.377 (0.485) 0.355 (0.479)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 55.91 (4.039) 57.77 (5.793)
College Degree*** 0.095 (0.294) 0.168 (0.374)
Male*** 0.446 (0.498) 0.719 (0.451)
Age of having first child*** 22.42 (3.562) 35.18 (4.291)
Age of having last child*** 30.88 (6.359) 38.67 (5.456)
Number of children*** 3.631 (1.979) 2.153 (1.406)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 5.11 (3.952) 5.908 (3.815)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.814 (3.514) 3.877 (3.746)
Health is good 0.703 (0.458) 0.692 (0.463)
Mental health is good 0.763 (0.426) 0.771 (0.422)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.374 (2.855) 4.324 (2.711)
Chance will live > 75 6.107 (3.154) 6.322 (3.145)
Chance will live > 85 4.054 (3.32) 4.213 (3.361)
Earnings (in thousand)** 24.49 (22.52) 26.82 (27.13)
Networth (in thousand) 37.13 (37.66) 34.73 (48.2)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.274 (0.447) 0.436 (0.498)
Financial assistance (in thousand) 0.997 (6.285) 1.498 (2.849)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 3.867 (3.309) 4.638 (3.592)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.6: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for high net worth
group
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 62.04 (5.606) 63.34 (5.861)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.444 (0.497) 0.306 (0.461)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 56.51 (4.121) 58.39 (5.704)
College Degree*** 0.267 (0.443) 0.427 (0.496)
Male*** 0.496 (0.501) 0.771 (0.421)
Age of having first child*** 23.43 (3.262) 34.48 (3.82)
Age of having last child*** 30.17 (5.35) 37.71 (4.783)
Number of children*** 3.066 (1.428) 2.031 (1.078)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 4.502 (3.942) 5.614 (3.899)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.381 (3.269) 3.647 (3.8)
Health is good 0.881 (0.325) 0.866 (0.342)
Mental health is good 0.898 (0.303) 0.881 (0.325)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 3.692 (2.742) 3.788 (2.604)
Chance will live > 75** 6.87 (2.655) 7.113 (2.519)
Chance will live > 85 4.568 (3.054) 4.613 (3.005)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 45.76 (45.16) 54.53 (63.36)
Networth (in thousand)*** 421.2 (627.7) 511.4 (796.5)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.471 (0.5) 0.644 (0.481)
Financial assistance (in thousand)*** 2.782 (9.411) 6.428 (15.31)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.276 (2.938) 4.915 (3.233)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.7: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for degree holder
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age 62.75 (5.612) 63.35 (5.403)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.332 (0.471) 0.245 (0.431)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 56.15 (4.05) 57.33 (5.064)
College Degree 1 (0) 1 (0)
Male*** 0.57 (0.495) 0.757 (0.429)
Age of having first child*** 24.64 (3.036) 34.4 (3.874)
Age of having last child*** 31.03 (5.4) 37.89 (4.806)
Number of children*** 2.935 (1.344) 2.096 (1.208)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 5.096 (3.851) 6.059 (3.656)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.945 (3.435) 4.185 (3.684)
Health is good 0.929 (0.257) 0.918 (0.275)
Mental health is good** 0.929 (0.257) 0.895 (0.307)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 3.691 (2.608) 3.639 (2.559)
Chance will live > 75 7.118 (2.375) 7.252 (2.253)
Chance will live > 85 4.942 (2.903) 5.092 (2.901)
Earnings (in thousand)* 58.88 (50.69) 64.58 (64.44)
Networth (in thousand) 389.8 (605.6) 444.8 (743.9)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.583 (0.493) 0.77 (0.425)
Financial assistance (in thousand)** 4.17 (15.54) 7.507 (18.2)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.48 (3) 5.172 (3.125)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.8: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for non degree holder
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 61.76 (5.594) 62.77 (5.814)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.434 (0.496) 0.369 (0.483)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 56.23 (4.102) 58.43 (6)
College Degree 0 (0) 0 (0)
Male*** 0.449 (0.497) 0.741 (0.439)
Age of having first child*** 22.56 (3.418) 34.99 (4.136)
Age of having last child*** 30.4 (5.964) 38.28 (5.273)
Number of children*** 3.429 (1.804) 2.086 (1.264)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 4.7 (3.983) 5.575 (3.963)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.481 (3.373) 3.497 (3.808)
Health is good** 0.764 (0.425) 0.723 (0.448)
Mental health is good 0.811 (0.392) 0.799 (0.401)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.095 (2.864) 4.251 (2.699)
Chance will live > 75 6.362 (3.026) 6.506 (3.066)
Chance will live > 85 4.178 (3.241) 4.123 (3.26)
Earnings (in thousand) 30.13 (31.51) 30.92 (40.15)
Networth (in thousand) 199.2 (452.2) 209.7 (544.2)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.328 (0.47) 0.43 (0.496)
Financial assistance (in thousand)* 1.429 (5.56) 2.089 (4.124)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 3.987 (3.151) 4.611 (3.516)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.9: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for male
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 62.15 (5.707) 63.14 (5.809)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.41 (0.492) 0.328 (0.47)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS *** 57 (4.533) 58.84 (6.104)
College Degree*** 0.222 (0.416) 0.307 (0.461)
Male 1 (0) 1 (0)
Age of having first child *** 24.25 (3.116) 35.18 (4.337)
Age of having last child*** 32.05 (6.086) 38.93 (5.394)
Number of children*** 3.305 (1.693) 2.219 (1.342)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 5.252 (3.988) 6.069 (3.791)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.949 (3.559) 3.998 (3.838)
Health is good 0.801 (0.4) 0.789 (0.408)
Mental health is good* 0.854 (0.353) 0.832 (0.374)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.066 (2.837) 4.009 (2.682)
Chance will live > 75*** 6.341 (3.002) 6.767 (2.798)
Chance will live > 85*** 3.963 (3.174) 4.343 (3.173)
Earnings (in thousand)* 39.65 (39.83) 42.63 (53.01)
Networth (in thousand)** 247.46 (510.1) 296.8 (628.9)
Give child financial assistance in past year** 0.372 (0.484) 0.513 (0.503)
Financial assistance (in thousand)** 1.496 (4.478) 2.609 (4.97)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.35 (3.122) 4.778 (3.362)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.10: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for female
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age 61.76 (5.514) 62.37 (5.311)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.416 (4.93) 0.342 (0.469)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS* 55.52 (3.513) 55.91 (3.818)
College Degree*** 0.149 (0.357) 0.288 (0.454)
Male 0 (0) 0 (0)
Age of having first child *** 21.77 (3.304) 33.75 (2.894)
Age of having last child*** 29.14 (5.305) 35.91 (3.422)
Number of children*** 3.368 (1.779) 1.708 (0.8)
Expect to work full time at 62* 4.329 (3.874) 4.814 (3.916)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.203 (3.166) 2.978 (3.467)
Health is good 0.789 (0.408) 0.76 (0.428)
Mental health is good 0.813 (0.39) 0.816 (0.388)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 3.943 (2.789) 4.079 (2.607)
Chance will live > 75 6.638 (2.862) 6.647 (3.03)
Chance will live > 85 4.62 (3.18) 4.634 (3.208)
Earnings (in thousand)** 31.58 (34.82) 36.69 (45.11)
Networth (in thousand) 222.3 (470.1) 234.2 (595.1)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.366 (0.482) 0.528 (0.5)
Financial assistance (in thousand) *** 1.872 (8.213) 3.885 (11.57)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 3.854 (3.117) 4.793 (3.543)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.11: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of having the last child
Have the last child Have the last child
at/before age 35 after age 35
Self Reported Retiring Age*** 61.81 (5.6) 62.87 (5.66)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.419 (0.493) 0.35 (0.477)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 55.97 (3.97) 57.95 (5.17)
College Degree** 0.192 (0.394) 0.212 (0.409)
Male*** 0.444 (0.497) 0.685 (0.465)
Age of having first child*** 23.27 (3.97) 27.99 (6.96)
Age of having last child*** 28.74 (3.99) 40.13 (4.26)
Number of children*** 2.953 (1.487) 4.044 (2.274)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 4.694 (3.94) 5.629 (3.949)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.51 (3.353) 3.459 (3.723)
Health is good*** 0.802 (0.399) 0.755 (0.43)
Mental health is good*** 0.837 (0.37) 0.81 (0.393)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.005 (2.778) 4.057 (2.868)
Chance will live > 75 6.528 (2.911) 6.526 (2.985)
Chance will live > 85 4.318 (3.184) 4.391 (3.25)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 36.79 (38.58) 33.1 (41.62)
Networth (in thousand)** 244.29 (499.12) 219.96 (534.25)
Give child financial assistance in past year 0.371 (0.483) 0.392 (0.489)
Financial assistance (in thousand) 1.9 (8.23) 2.16 (7.6)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.04 (3.091) 4.554 (3.411)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table 3.12: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for people who have
the last child after age 35
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age** 62.66 (5.64) 63.33 (5.65)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62*** 0.37 (0.483) 0.309 (0.462)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 57.55 (4.66) 58.76 (6.03)
College Degree*** 0.173 (0.379) 0.299 (0.458)
Male*** 0.634 (0.482) 0.802 (0.399)
Age of having first child*** 23.88 (3.53) 36.19 (4.39)
Age of having last child*** 39.76 (4.12) 40.83 (4.43)
Number of children*** 4.81 (2.134) 2.424 (1.374)
Expect to work full time at 62*** 5.347 (4.051) 6.159 (3.691)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 3.123 (3.642) 4.086 (3.79)
Health is good 0.751 (0.433) 0.771 (0.421)
Mental health is good 0.808 (0.394) 0.817 (0.387)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 4.078 (2.963) 4.021 (2.681)
Chance will live > 75** 6.422 (3.046) 6.74 (2.839)
Chance will live > 85 4.339 (3.293) 4.492 (3.15)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 30.33 (36.49) 39.47 (50.17)
Networth (in thousand)*** 180.14 (428.28) 299.22 (676.64)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.372 (0.484) 0.495 (0.501)
Financial assistance (in thousand)*** 1.7 (4.53) 3.96 (13.6)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.394 (3.387) 4.921 (3.428)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level.
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Table 3.13: Individuals’ characteristics by timing of parenthood for people who have
the last child at/before age 35
Early Parents Late Parents
Self Reported Retiring Age 61.79 (5.59) 62.29 (5.71)
Claim Social Security Benefit at 62** 0.422 (0.494) 0.362 (0.481)
Age observed in wave 1 of HRS*** 55.93 (3.9) 56.87 (4.99)
College Degree*** 0.186 (0.389) 0.308 (0.462)
Male*** 0.435 (0.496) 0.642 (0.48)
Age of having first child*** 22.73 (3.39) 32.28 (1.23)
Age of having last child*** 28.48 (3.93) 33.27 (1.37)
Number of children*** 3.016 (1.453) 1.474 (0.6)
Expect to work full time at 62* 4.68 (3.931) 5.107 (4.034)
Expect to work full time at 65*** 2.475 (3.33) 3.21 (3.693)
Health is good 0.804 (0.397) 0.802 (0.399)
Mental health is good 0.838 (0.369) 0.847 (0.36)
Limit work activity by health in next 10 years 3.992 (2.784) 4.032 (2.639)
Chance will live > 75 6.521 (2.904) 6.725 (2.904)
Chance will live > 85 4.317 (3.173) 4.299 (3.243)
Earnings (in thousand)*** 36.52 (37.63) 44.23 (52.94)
Networth (in thousand) 246.09 (501.32) 247.75 (501.42)
Give child financial assistance in past year*** 0.366 (0.482) 0.557 (0.498)
Financial assistance (in thousand)** 1.86 (8.38) 3.24 (5.55)
Give major financial help to family members in next 10 years*** 4.011 (3.067) 4.534 (3.367)
a Source: Author’s calculation from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
b Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
c Statistical tests on the equality of proportions/mean between early parents and late parents: ***Denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and *denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level.
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